你还不知道!ACCA哪种教材比较好?看这里

发布时间:2020-04-11


好消息!好消息!关于ACCA哪种教材比较好有消息啦!小伙伴们还不知道吗?今天就紧跟51题库考试学习网的脚步一起来看看吧。

目前,ACCA总共有三大认可版本的教材及练习册,分别是BPP,Kaplan及Becker。如何选择哪个版本的教材呢?

三个版本的教材都有哪些特点?

1、BPP以详细见称,BPP教材是全球ACCA使用最多的版本,通俗易懂,比较适合新老学员自学,ACCA学员以看BPP课本及精简版讲义为主。同时但国内基本上所有的高校ACCA专业也是使用的BPP版教材,因为审计署买下了BPP教材在中国的版权,并且比之FTC版教材价格也有优势,每个点都讲解得很细。ACCA教材BPP版本主要适合于英语水平一般的,理解能力稍微弱的或者是初学者等。但是ACCA教材BPP版本很多的,有时候讲得也很啰嗦。

2、FTC版是ACCA官方版本教材,在全球使用也比较多。这套教材的优点是简洁,基本上每门课教材都比BPP版薄,但是FTC对LW阶段的ACCA备考并不是那么适用,其难度较之BPP版有所加大,所用单词也要复杂一些。而且最新版有些地方讲解不是很细致,单凭它参加考试有一定难度。

3、目前BPP&FTC两种都较适合中国ACCA考生,关键在于其编撰风格对大家各自的适应程度如何。不管是FTC还是BPP的ACCA教材都只是负责知识点的讲解的,最终出题目的还是还是官方的。不管选择何种教材,ACCA学员在备考时,都一定要结合大纲,将ACCA教材多看几遍,再多做练习题,这样才不会在考试中失利,顺利的通过ACCA考试。

推荐阅读:

1、全国各地区ACCA人才优惠优待政策;

2、怎样可以快速拿下ACCA证书;

3、2020年ACCA考试报名费用一览。

上文讲的就是ACCA哪种教材比较好的内容啦,下面我们再来看看ACCA的其他内容。

注册资格

a.具有教育部认可的大专以上学历,既可以报名成为ACCA的正式学员。

b.教育部认可的高等院校在校生,且顺利通过第一学年的所有课程考试,既可报名成为ACCA正式学员。

c.未符合以上报名资格的申请者,但年龄在18岁以上,可以先注册为FIA,并通过FAB,FMA,FFA三门考试(该三门考试与AB、MA、FA一致)便可以转为ACCA正式学员(需要在账户中选择转换路径),并获得前三门免试,直接进入ACCA技能课程阶段的考试。

以上就是关于ACCA哪种教材比较好的全部内容啦,还有没有不清楚的小伙伴呢?欢迎您咨询51题库考试学习网,我们在这里等你哦!


下面小编为大家准备了 ACCA考试 的相关考题,供大家学习参考。

5 GE Railways plc (GER) operates a passenger train service in Holtland. The directors have always focused solely on

the use of traditional financial measures in order to assess the performance of GER since it commenced operations

in 1992. The Managing Director of GER has asked you, as a management accountant, for assistance with regard to

the adoption of a balanced scorecard approach to performance measurement within GER.

Required:

(a) Prepare a memorandum explaining the potential benefits and limitations that may arise from the adoption of

a balanced scorecard approach to performance measurement within GER. (8 marks)

正确答案:
(a) To: Board of directors
From: Management Accountant
Date: 8 June 2007
The potential benefits of the adoption of a balanced scorecard approach to performance measurement within GER are as
follows:
A broader business perspective
Financial measures invariably have an inward-looking perspective. The balanced scorecard is wider in its scope and
application. It has an external focus and looks at comparisons with competitors in order to establish what constitutes best
practice and ensures that required changes are made in order to achieve it. The use of the balanced scorecard requires a
balance of both financial and non-financial measures and goals.
A greater strategic focus
The use of the balanced scorecard focuses to a much greater extent on the longer term. There is a far greater emphasis on
strategic considerations. It attempts to identify the needs and wants of customers and the new products and markets. Hence
it requires a balance between short term and long term performance measures.
A greater focus on qualitative aspects
The use of the balanced scorecard attempts to overcome the over-emphasis of traditional measures on the quantifiable aspects
of the internal operations of an organisation expressed in purely financial terms. Its use requires a balance between
quantitative and qualitative performance measures. For example, customer satisfaction is a qualitative performance measure
which is given prominence under the balanced scorecard approach.
A greater focus on longer term performance
The use of traditional financial measures is often dominated by financial accounting requirements, for example, the need to
show fixed assets at their historic cost. Also, they are primarily focused on short-term profitability and return on capital
employed in order to gain stakeholder approval of short term financial reports, the longer term or whole life cycle often being
ignored.
The limitations of a balanced scorecard approach to performance measurement may be viewed as follows:
The balanced scorecard attempts to identify the chain of cause and effect relationships which will provide the stimulus for
the future success of an organisation.
Advocates of a balanced scorecard approach to performance measurement suggest that it can constitute a vital component
of the strategic management process.
However, Robert Kaplan and David Norton, the authors of the balanced scorecard concept concede that it may not be suitable
for all firms. Norton suggests that it is most suitable for firms which have a long lead time between management action and
financial benefit and that it will be less suitable for firms with a short-term focus. However, other flaws can be detected in
the balanced scorecard.
The balanced scorecard promises to outline the theory of the firm by clearly linking the driver/outcome measures in a cause
and effect chain, but this will be difficult if not impossible to achieve.
The precise cause and effect relationships between measures for each of the perspectives on the balanced scorecard will be
complex because the driver and outcome measures for the various perspectives are interlinked. For example, customer
satisfaction may be seen to be a function of several drivers, such as employee satisfaction, manufacturing cycle time and
quality. However, employee satisfaction may in turn be partially driven by customer satisfaction and employee satisfaction
may partially drive manufacturing cycle time. A consequence of this non-linearity of the cause and effect chain (i.e., there is
non-linear relationship between an individual driver and a single outcome measure), is that there must be a question mark
as to the accuracy of any calculated correlations between driver and outcome measures. Allied to this point, any calculated
correlations will be historic. This implies that it will only be possible to determine the accuracy of cause and effect linkages
after the event, which could make the use of the balanced scorecard in dynamic industries questionable. If the market is
undergoing rapid evolution, for example, how meaningful are current measures of customer satisfaction or market share?
These criticisms do not necessarily undermine the usefulness of the balanced scorecard in presenting a more comprehensive
picture of organisational performance but they do raise doubts concerning claims that a balanced scorecard can be
constructed which will outline a clear cause and effect chain between driver and outcome measures and the firm’s financial
objectives.

Moonstar Co is a property development company which is planning to undertake a $200 million commercial property development. Moonstar Co has had some difficulties over the last few years, with some developments not generating the expected returns and the company has at times struggled to pay its finance costs. As a result Moonstar Co’s credit rating has been lowered, affecting the terms it can obtain for bank finance. Although Moonstar Co is listed on its local stock exchange, 75% of the share capital is held by members of the family who founded the company. The family members who are shareholders do not wish to subscribe for a rights issue and are unwilling to dilute their control over the company by authorising a new issue of equity shares. Moonstar Co’s board is therefore considering other methods of financing the development, which the directors believe will generate higher returns than other recent investments, as the country where Moonstar Co is based appears to be emerging from recession.

Securitisation proposals

One of the non-executive directors of Moonstar Co has proposed that it should raise funds by means of a securitisation process, transferring the rights to the rental income from the commercial property development to a special purpose vehicle. Her proposals assume that the leases will generate an income of 11% per annum to Moonstar Co over a ten-year period. She proposes that Moonstar Co should use 90% of the value of the investment for a collateralised loan obligation which should be structured as follows:

– 60% of the collateral value to support a tranche of A-rated floating rate loan notes offering investors LIBOR plus 150 basis points

– 15% of the collateral value to support a tranche of B-rated fixed rate loan notes offering investors 12%

– 15% of the collateral value to support a tranche of C-rated fixed rate loan notes offering investors 13%

– 10% of the collateral value to support a tranche as subordinated certificates, with the return being the excess of receipts over payments from the securitisation process

The non-executive director believes that there will be sufficient demand for all tranches of the loan notes from investors. Investors will expect that the income stream from the development to be low risk, as they will expect the property market to improve with the recession coming to an end and enough potential lessees to be attracted by the new development.

The non-executive director predicts that there would be annual costs of $200,000 in administering the loan. She acknowledges that there would be interest rate risks associated with the proposal, and proposes a fixed for variable interest rate swap on the A-rated floating rate notes, exchanging LIBOR for 9·5%.

However the finance director believes that the prediction of the income from the development that the non-executive director has made is over-optimistic. He believes that it is most likely that the total value of the rental income will be 5% lower than the non-executive director has forecast. He believes that there is some risk that the returns could be so low as to jeopardise the income for the C-rated fixed rate loan note holders.

Islamic finance

Moonstar Co’s chief executive has wondered whether Sukuk finance would be a better way of funding the development than the securitisation.

Moonstar Co’s chairman has pointed out that a major bank in the country where Moonstar Co is located has begun to offer a range of Islamic financial products. The chairman has suggested that a Mudaraba contract would be the most appropriate method of providing the funds required for the investment.

Required:

(a) Calculate the amounts in $ which each of the tranches can expect to receive from the securitisation arrangement proposed by the non-executive director and discuss how the variability in rental income affects the returns from the securitisation. (11 marks)

(b) Discuss the benefits and risks for Moonstar Co associated with the securitisation arrangement that the non-executive director has proposed. (6 marks)

(c) (i) Discuss the suitability of Sukuk finance to fund the investment, including an assessment of its appeal to potential investors. (4 marks)

(ii) Discuss whether a Mudaraba contract would be an appropriate method of financing the investment and discuss why the bank may have concerns about providing finance by this method. (4 marks)

正确答案:

(a) An annual cash flow account compares the estimated cash flows receivable from the property against the liabilities within the securitisation process. The swap introduces leverage into the arrangement.

The holders of the certificates are expected to receive $3·17million on $18 million, giving them a return of 17·6%. If the cash flows are 5% lower than the non-executive director has predicted, annual revenue received will fall to $20·90 million, reducing the balance available for the subordinated certificates to $2·07 million, giving a return of 11·5% on the subordinated certificates, which is below the returns offered on the B and C-rated loan notes. The point at which the holders of the certificates will receive nothing and below which the holders of the C-rated loan notes will not receive their full income will be an annual income of $18·83 million (a return of 9·4%), which is 14·4% less than the income that the non-executive director has forecast.

(b) Benefits

The finance costs of the securitisation may be lower than the finance costs of ordinary loan capital. The cash flows from the commercial property development may be regarded as lower risk than Moonstar Co’s other revenue streams. This will impact upon the rates that Moonstar Co is able to offer borrowers.

The securitisation matches the assets of the future cash flows to the liabilities to loan note holders. The non-executive director is assuming a steady stream of lease income over the next 10 years, with the development probably being close to being fully occupied over that period.

The securitisation means that Moonstar Co is no longer concerned with the risk that the level of earnings from the properties will be insufficient to pay the finance costs. Risks have effectively been transferred to the loan note holders.

Risks

Not all of the tranches may appeal to investors. The risk-return relationship on the subordinated certificates does not look very appealing, with the return quite likely to be below what is received on the C-rated loan notes. Even the C-rated loan note holders may question the relationship between the risk and return if there is continued uncertainty in the property sector.

If Moonstar Co seeks funding from other sources for other developments, transferring out a lower risk income stream means that the residual risks associated with the rest of Moonstar Co’s portfolio will be higher. This may affect the availability and terms of other borrowing.

It appears that the size of the securitisation should be large enough for the costs to be bearable. However Moonstar Co may face unforeseen costs, possibly unexpected management or legal expenses.

(c) (i) Sukuk finance could be appropriate for the securitisation of the leasing portfolio. An asset-backed Sukuk would be the same kind of arrangement as the securitisation, where assets are transferred to a special purpose vehicle and the returns and repayments are directly financed by the income from the assets. The Sukuk holders would bear the risks and returns of the relationship.

The other type of Sukuk would be more like a sale and leaseback of the development. Here the Sukuk holders would be guaranteed a rental, so it would seem less appropriate for Moonstar Co if there is significant uncertainty about the returns from the development.

The main issue with the asset-backed Sukuk finance is whether it would be as appealing as certainly the A-tranche of the securitisation arrangement which the non-executive director has proposed. The safer income that the securitisation offers A-tranche investors may be more appealing to investors than a marginally better return from the Sukuk. There will also be costs involved in establishing and gaining approval for the Sukuk, although these costs may be less than for the securitisation arrangement described above.

(ii) A Mudaraba contract would involve the bank providing capital for Moonstar Co to invest in the development. Moonstar Co would manage the investment which the capital funded. Profits from the investment would be shared with the bank, but losses would be solely borne by the bank. A Mudaraba contract is essentially an equity partnership, so Moonstar Co might not face the threat to its credit rating which it would if it obtained ordinary loan finance for the development. A Mudaraba contract would also represent a diversification of sources of finance. It would not require the commitment to pay interest that loan finance would involve.

Moonstar Co would maintain control over the running of the project. A Mudaraba contract would offer a method of obtaining equity funding without the dilution of control which an issue of shares to external shareholders would bring. This is likely to make it appealing to Moonstar Co’s directors, given their desire to maintain a dominant influence over the business.

The bank would be concerned about the uncertainties regarding the rental income from the development. Although the lack of involvement by the bank might appeal to Moonstar Co's directors, the bank might not find it so attractive. The bank might be concerned about information asymmetry – that Moonstar Co’s management might be reluctant to supply the bank with the information it needs to judge how well its investment is performing.


(b) Briefly describe the five extreme scores identified by Blake and Mouton. (5 marks)

正确答案:
Part (b):
Blake and Mouton analysed the extreme scores as:
1,1 – Impoverished Management
low concern for production and low concern for people.
This manager only makes the minimum effort in either area and will make the smallest possible effort required to get
the job done.
1,9 – Country Club Management
low concern for production and high concern for people.
This manager is thoughtful and attentive to the need of the people, which leads to a comfortable friendly organisation
atmosphere but very little ‘work’ is actually achieved.
9,1 – Task Management
high concern for production and low concern for people.
This manager is only concerned with production and arranges work in such a way that people interference is minimised.
5,5 – Middle of the Road Management
reasonable concern for both dimensions.
This manager is able to balance the task in hand and motivate the people to achieve these tasks.
9,9 – Team Management
High concern for production and high concern for people.
This manager integrates the two areas to foster working together and high production to produce true team leadership.
(Candidates may wish to draw the grid and describe these scores).

1 Your client, Island Co, is a manufacturer of machinery used in the coal extraction industry. You are currently planning

the audit of the financial statements for the year ended 30 November 2007. The draft financial statements show

revenue of $125 million (2006 – $103 million), profit before tax of $5·6 million (2006 – $5·1 million) and total

assets of $95 million (2006 – $90 million). Your firm was appointed as auditor to Island Co for the first time in June

2007.

Island Co designs, constructs and installs machinery for five key customers. Payment is due in three instalments: 50%

is due when the order is confirmed (stage one), 25% on delivery of the machinery (stage two), and 25% on successful

installation in the customer’s coal mine (stage three). Generally it takes six months from the order being finalised until

the final installation.

At 30 November, there is an amount outstanding of $2·85 million from Jacks Mine Co. The amount is a disputed

stage three payment. Jacks Mine Co is refusing to pay until the machinery, which was installed in August 2007, is

running at 100% efficiency.

One customer, Sawyer Co, communicated in November 2007, via its lawyers with Island Co, claiming damages for

injuries suffered by a drilling machine operator whose arm was severely injured when a machine malfunctioned. Kate

Shannon, the chief executive officer of Island Co, has told you that the claim is being ignored as it is generally known

that Sawyer Co has a poor health and safety record, and thus the accident was their fault. Two orders which were

placed by Sawyer Co in October 2007 have been cancelled.

Work in progress is valued at $8·5 million at 30 November 2007. A physical inventory count was held on

17 November 2007. The chief engineer estimated the stage of completion of each machine at that date. One of the

major components included in the coal extracting machinery is now being sourced from overseas. The new supplier,

Locke Co, is located in Spain and invoices Island Co in euros. There is a trade payable of $1·5 million owing to Locke

Co recorded within current liabilities.

All machines are supplied carrying a one year warranty. A warranty provision is recognised on the balance sheet at

$2·5 million (2006 – $2·4 million). Kate Shannon estimates the cost of repairing defective machinery reported by

customers, and this estimate forms the basis of the provision.

Kate Shannon owns 60% of the shares in Island Co. She also owns 55% of Pacific Co, which leases a head office to

Island Co. Kate is considering selling some of her shares in Island Co in late January 2008, and would like the audit

to be finished by that time.

Required:

(a) Using the information provided, identify and explain the principal audit risks, and any other matters to be

considered when planning the final audit for Island Co for the year ended 30 November 2007.

Note: your answer should be presented in the format of briefing notes to be used at a planning meeting.

Requirement (a) includes 2 professional marks. (13 marks)

正确答案:
1 ISLAND CO
(a) Briefing Notes
Subject: Principal Audit Risks – Island Co
Revenue Recognition – timing
Island Co raises sales invoices in three stages. There is potential for breach of IAS 18 Revenue, which states that revenue
should only be recognised once the seller has the right to receive it, in other words the seller has performed its contractual
obligations. This right does not necessarily correspond to amounts falling due for payment in accordance with an invoice
schedule agreed with a customer as part of a contract. Island Co appears to receive payment from its customers in advance
of performing any obligation, as the stage one invoice is raised when an order is confirmed i.e. before any work has actually
taken place. This creates the potential for revenue to be recognised too early, in advance of any performance of contractual
obligation. When a payment is received in advance of performance, a liability should be recognised equal to the amount
received, representing the obligation under the contract. Therefore a significant risk is that revenue is overstated and liabilities
understated.
Tutorial note: Equivalent guidance is also provided in IAS 11 Construction Contracts and credit will be awarded where
candidates discuss revenue recognition under IAS 11 as Island Co is providing a single substantial asset for a customer
under the terms of a contract.
Disputed receivable
The amount owed from Jacks Mine Co is highly material as it represents 50·9% of profit before tax, 2·3% of revenue, and
3% of total assets. The risk is that the receivable is overstated if no impairment of the disputed receivable is recognised.
Legal claim
The claim should be investigated seriously by Island Co. The chief executive officer’s (CEO) opinion that the claim will not
result in any financial consequence for Island Co is na?ve and flippant. Damages could be awarded against Island Co if it is
found that the machinery is faulty. The recurring high level of warranty provision implies that machinery faults are fairly
common and therefore the accident could be the result of a defective machine being supplied to Sawyer Co. The risk is that
no provision is created for the potential damages under IAS 37 Provisions, Contingent Liabilities and Contingent Assets, if the
likelihood of paying damages is considered probable. Alternatively, if the likelihood of damages being paid to Sawyer Co is
considered a possibility then a disclosure note should be made in the financial statements describing the nature and possible
financial effect of the contingent liability. As discussed below, the CEO, Kate Shannon, has an incentive not to make a
provision or disclose a contingent liability due to the planned share sale post year end.
A further risk is that any legal fees associated with the claim have not been accrued within the financial statements. As the
claim has arisen during the year, the expense must be included in this year’s income statement, even if the claim is still ongoing
at the year end.
The fact that the legal claim is effectively being ignored may cast doubts on the overall integrity of senior management, and
on the integrity of the financial statements. Management representations should be approached with a degree of professional
scepticism during the audit.
Sawyer Co has cancelled two orders. If the amounts are still outstanding at the year end then it is highly likely that Sawyer
Co will not pay the invoiced amounts, and thus receivables are overstated. If the stage one payments have already been made,
then Sawyer Co may claim a refund, in which case a provision should be made to repay the amount, or a contingent liability
disclosed in a note to the financial statements.
Sawyer Co is one of only five major customers, and losing this customer could have future going concern implications for
Island Co if a new source of revenue cannot be found to replace the lost income stream from Sawyer Co. If the legal claim
becomes public knowledge, and if Island Co is found to have supplied faulty machinery, then it will be difficult to attract new
customers.
A case of this nature could bring bad publicity to Island Co, a potential going concern issue if it results in any of the five key
customers terminating orders with Island Co. The auditors should plan to extend the going concern work programme to
incorporate the issues noted above.
Inventories
Work in progress is material to the financial statements, representing 8·9% of total assets. The inventory count was held two
weeks prior to the year end. There is an inherent risk that the valuation has not been correctly rolled forward to a year end
position.
The key risk is the estimation of the stage of completion of work in progress. This is subjective, and knowledge appears to
be confined to the chief engineer. Inventory could be overvalued if the machines are assessed to be more complete than they
actually are at the year end. Absorption of labour costs and overheads into each machine is a complex calculation and must
be done consistently with previous years.
It will also be important that consumable inventories not yet utilised on a machine, e.g. screws, nuts and bolts, are correctly
valued and included as inventories of raw materials within current assets.
Overseas supplier
As the supplier is new, controls may not yet have been established over the recording of foreign currency transactions.
Inherent risk is high as the trade payable should be retranslated using the year end exchange rate per IAS 21 The Effects of
Changes in Foreign Exchange Rates. If the retranslation is not performed at the year end, the trade payable could be
significantly over or under valued, depending on the movement of the dollar to euro exchange rate between the purchase date
and the year end. The components should remain at historic cost within inventory valuation and should not be retranslated
at the year end.
Warranty provision
The warranty provision is material at 2·6% of total assets (2006 – 2·7%). The provision has increased by only $100,000,
an increase of 4·2%, compared to a revenue increase of 21·4%. This could indicate an underprovision as the percentage
change in revenue would be expected to be in line with the percentage change in the warranty provision, unless significant
improvements had been made to the quality of machines installed for customers during the year. This appears unlikely given
the legal claim by Sawyer Co, and the machines installed at Jacks Mine Co operating inefficiently. The basis of the estimate
could be understated to avoid charging the increase in the provision as an expense through the income statement. This is of
special concern given that it is the CEO and majority shareholder who estimates the warranty provision.
Majority shareholder
Kate Shannon exerts control over Island Co via a majority shareholding, and by holding the position of CEO. This greatly
increases the inherent risk that the financial statements could be deliberately misstated, i.e. overvaluation of assets,
undervaluation of liabilities, and thus overstatement of profits. The risk is severe at this year end as Kate Shannon is hoping
to sell some Island Co shares post year end. As the price that she receives for these shares will be to a large extent influenced
by the balance sheet position of the company at 30 November 2007, she has a definite interest in manipulating the financial
statements for her own personal benefit. For example:
– Not recognising a provision or contingent liability for the legal claim from Sawyer Co
– Not providing for the potentially irrecoverable receivable from Jacks Mines Co
– Not increasing the warranty provision
– Recognising revenue earlier than permitted by IAS 18 Revenue.
Related party transactions
Kate Shannon controls Island Co and also controls Pacific Co. Transactions between the two companies should be disclosed
per IAS 24 Related Party Disclosures. There is risk that not all transactions have been disclosed, or that a transaction has
been disclosed at an inappropriate value. Details of the lease contract between the two companies should be disclosed within
a note to the financial statements, in particular, any amounts owed from Island Co to Pacific Co at 30 November 2007 should
be disclosed.
Other issues
– Kate Shannon wants the audit to be completed as soon as possible, which brings forward the deadline for completion
of the audit. The audit team may not have time to complete all necessary procedures, or there may not be time for
adequate reviews to be carried out on the work performed. Detection risk, and thus audit risk is increased, and the
overall quality of the audit could be jeopardised.
– This is especially important given that this is the first year audit and therefore the audit team will be working with a
steep learning curve. Audit procedures may take longer than originally planned, yet there is little time to extend
procedures where necessary.
– Kate Shannon may also exert considerable influence on the members of the audit team to ensure that the financial
statements show the best possible position of Island Co in view of her share sale. It is crucial that the audit team
members adhere strictly to ethical guidelines and that independence is beyond question.
– Due to the seriousness of the matters noted above, a final matter to be considered at the planning stage is that a second
partner review (Engagement Quality Control Review) should be considered for the audit this year end. A suitable
independent reviewer should be indentified, and time planned and budgeted for at the end of the assignment.
Conclusion
From the range of issues discussed in these briefing notes, it can be seen that the audit of Island Co will be a relatively high
risk engagement.

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