考生收藏!ACCA注册报名流程

发布时间:2021-05-27


随着会计行业的高速发展,报考ACCA考试的人越来越多,报名注册ACCA考试时在费用缴纳环节有时候会附带产生一些问题,这些问题又应该如何解决呢?接下来就和51题库考试学习网一起去了解下吧!

1.ACCA考试注册报名所需费用要一次交清吗?

不是的,ACCA注册报名时只需交注册费(按当年费用标准),以后再逐项交纳免试费、年费、考试费。考生可以随时关注自己MYACCA的账单,并且注册后未及时上缴年费,会收到催缴邮件,补上就可以了。考试费用根据每次的报考科目和报考时间段来进行缴费。在ACCA考试13个科目中,如果有挂科没有通过,那么,下一个考季还要继续报名考试,还要递交考试费用。

不同考生注册ACCA时间的不同,导致年费缴纳的时间不同。考试费受考试阶段和ACCA报考时间影响,所以准备报考的考生抓紧时间报名。

2.ACCA考试费用都需交英镑吗?

是的,一律按照ACCA考试报名当时的英镑汇率进行结算。注册费、年费、考试费、免试费和申请牛津布鲁克斯大学学位的管理费需用英镑结算,可以通过银行汇票或国际结付的信用卡支付。办理银行汇票可以用外汇或人民币。凭身份证就可以到有外汇业务和票汇业务的银行办理换汇和票汇业务。

ACCA总部推荐学员使用双币信用卡在线考试报名。这样将可以及时确认报名成功并且可以享受提前考试报名时段的优惠价格。

3.关于ACCA考试报名付款问题

有些ACCA考试小伙伴反映,银行卡已划款,但MY ACCA10分钟内尚未入账,或者注册时仍旧提示需要付款。则说明付款用于网络问题接收失败,请重新支付。支付失败的款项会在7个工作日左右原路退回到支付卡。如未及时收到退款,请及时联系ACCA查询。

还有一种情况是,付款时出现错误,无法支付。说明可能网络或者浏览器有问题,请尝试其他电脑和浏览器,如果还是无法解决问题。请截屏联系ACCA总部(ACCA 24小时全球客服中心:students@accaglobal.com;电话:0044141-5822000)。

4.欠费被除名后如何恢复ACCA身份?

有些ACCA考试小伙伴长期忘记清缴年费,甚至受到催缴邮件后也不上心,没有进行及时缴费,等到需要报名考试的时候,登陆后才发现都被除名了,应该怎么办?

请已被除名的学员/会员发邮件到ACCA 24小时全球客服中心索要电子版的重新注册表格。学员需要缴纳当年欠费及重新注册费,并填写重新注册表后传真或致电英国总部。会员需要缴纳过往欠费及重新注册费,并填写重新注册表后传真或致电英国总部。具体事宜及表格索要可以联系当地代表处,让当地ACCA工作人员协助解决。

以上就是今天分享的全部内容了,各位小伙伴根据自己的情况进行查阅,希望本文对各位有所帮助,预祝各位取得满意的成绩,如需了解更多相关内容,请关注51题库考试学习网!


下面小编为大家准备了 ACCA考试 的相关考题,供大家学习参考。

This scenario summarises the development of a company called Rock Bottom through three phases, from its founding in 1965 to 2008 when it ceased trading.

Phase 1 (1965–1988)

In 1965 customers usually purchased branded electrical goods, largely produced by well-established domestic companies, from general stores that stocked a wide range of household products. However, in that year, a recent university graduate, Rick Hein, established his first shop specialising solely in the sale of electrical goods. In contrast to the general stores, Rick Hein’s shop predominantly sold imported Japanese products which were smaller, more reliable and more sophisticated than the products of domestic competitors. Rick Hein quickly established a chain of shops, staffed by young people who understood the capabilities of the products they were selling. He backed this up with national advertising in the press, an innovation at the time for such a specialist shop. He branded his shops as ‘Rock Bottom’, a name which specifically referred to his cheap prices, but also alluded to the growing importance of

rock music and its influence on product sales. In 1969, 80% of sales were of music centres, turntables, amplifiers and speakers, bought by the newly affluent young. Rock Bottom began increasingly to specialise in selling audio equipment.

Hein also developed a high public profile. He dressed unconventionally and performed a number of outrageous stunts that publicised his company. He also encouraged the managers of his stores to be equally outrageous. He rewarded their individuality with high salaries, generous bonus schemes and autonomy. Many of the shops were extremely successful, making their managers (and some of their staff) relatively wealthy people.

However, by 1980 the profitability of the Rock Bottom shops began to decline significantly. Direct competitors using a similar approach had emerged, including specialist sections in the large general stores that had initially failed to react to the challenge of Rock Bottom. The buying public now expected its electrical products to be cheap and reliable.

Hein himself became less flamboyant and toned down his appearance and actions to satisfy the banks who were becoming an increasingly important source of the finance required to expand and support his chain of shops.

Phase 2 (1989–2002)

In 1988 Hein considered changing the Rock Bottom shops into a franchise, inviting managers to buy their own shops (which at this time were still profitable) and pursuing expansion though opening new shops with franchisees from outside the company. However, instead, he floated the company on the country’s stock exchange. He used some of the capital raised to expand the business. However, he also sold shares to help him throw the ‘party of a lifetime’ and to purchase expensive goods and gifts for his family. Hein became Chairman and Chief Executive Officer (CEO) of the newly quoted company, but over the next thirteen years his relationship with his board and shareholders became increasingly difficult. Gradually new financial controls and reporting systems were put in place. Most of the established managers left as controls became more centralised and formal. The company’s performance was solid but unspectacular. Hein complained that ‘business was not fun any more’. The company was legally required to publish directors’ salaries in its annual report and the generous salary package enjoyed by the Chairman and CEO increasingly became an issue and it dominated the 2002 Annual General Meeting (AGM). Hein was embarrassed by its publication and the discussion it led to in the national media. He felt that it was an infringement of his privacy and

civil liberties.

Phase 3 (2003–2008)

In 2003 Hein found the substantial private equity investment necessary to take Rock Bottom private again. He also used all of his personal fortune to help re-acquire the company from the shareholders. He celebrated ‘freeing Rock Bottom from its shackles’ by throwing a large celebration party. Celebrities were flown in from all over the world to attend. However, most of the new generation of store managers found Hein’s style. to be too loose and unfocused. He became rude and angry about their lack of entrepreneurial spirit. Furthermore, changes in products and how they were purchased meant that fewer people bought conventional audio products from specialist shops. The reliability of these products now meant that they were replaced relatively infrequently. Hein, belatedly, started to consider selling via an Internet site. Turnover and profitability plummeted. In 2007 Hein again considered franchising the company,but he realised that this was unlikely to be successful. In early 2008 the company ceased trading and Hein himself,now increasingly vilified and attacked by the press, filed for personal bankruptcy.

Required:

(a) Analyse the reasons for Rock Bottom’s success or failure in each of the three phases identified in the

scenario. Evaluate how Rick Hein’s leadership style. contributed to the success or failure of each phase.

(18 marks)

(b) Rick Hein considered franchising the Rock Bottom brand at two points in its history – 1988 and 2007.

Explain the key factors that would have made franchising Rock Bottom feasible in 1988, but would have

made it ‘unlikely to be successful’ in 2007. (7 marks)

正确答案:

(a) The product life cycle model suggests that a product passes through six stages: introduction, development, growth, shakeout,
maturity and decline. The first Rock Bottom phase appears to coincide with the introduction, development and growth periods
of the products offered by the company. These highly specified, high quality products were new to the country and were
quickly adopted by a certain consumer segment (see below). The life cycle concept also applies to services, and the innovative
way in which Rock Bottom sold and marketed the products distinguished the company from potential competitors. Not only
were these competitors still selling inferior and older products but their retail methods looked outdated compared with Rock Bottom’s bright, specialist shops. Rock Bottom’s entry into the market-place also exploited two important changes in the
external environment. The first was the technological advance of the Japanese consumer electronics industry. The second
was the growing economic power of young people, who wished to spend their increasing disposable income on products that
allowed them to enjoy popular music. Early entrants into an industry gain experience of that industry sooner than others. This
may not only be translated into cost advantages but also into customer loyalty that helps them through subsequent stages of
the product’s life cycle. Rock Bottom enjoyed the advantages of a first mover in this industry.
Hein’s leadership style. appears to have been consistent with contemporary society and more than acceptable to his young
target market. As an entrepreneur, his charismatic leadership was concerned with building a vision for the organisation and
then energising people to achieve it. The latter he achieved through appointing branch managers who reflected, to some
degree, his own style. and approach. His willingness to delegate considerable responsibility to these leaders, and to reward
them well, was also relatively innovative. The shops were also staffed by young people who understood the capabilities of the
products they were selling. It was an early recognition that intangible resources of skills and knowledge were important to the
organisation.
In summary, in the first phase Rock Bottom’s organisation and Hein’s leadership style. appear to have been aligned with
contemporary society, the customer base, employees and Rock Bottom’s position in the product/service life cycle.
The second phase of the Rock Bottom story appears to reflect the shakeout and maturity phases of the product life cycle. The
entry of competitors into the market is a feature of the growth stage. However, it is in the shakeout stage that the market
becomes saturated with competitors. The Rock Bottom product and service approach is easily imitated. Hein initially reacted
to these new challenges by a growing maturity, recognising that outrageous behaviour might deter the banks from lending to
him. However, the need to raise money to fund expansion and a latent need to realise (and enjoy) his investment led to the
company being floated on the country’s stock exchange. This, eventually, created two problems.
The first was the need for the company to provide acceptable returns to shareholders. This would have been a new challenge
for Hein. He would have to not only maintain dividends to external shareholders, but he would also have to monitor and
improve the publicly quoted share price. In an attempt to establish an organisation that could deliver such value, changes
were made in the organisational structure and style. Most of the phase 1 entrepreneur-style. managers left. This may have
been inevitable anyway as Rock Bottom would have had problems continuing with such high individual reward packages in
a maturing market. However, the new public limited organisation also demanded managers who were more transactional
leaders, focusing on designing systems and controlling performance. This style. of management was alien to Rick’s approach.
The second problem was the need for the organisation to become more transparent. The publishing of Hein’s financial details
was embarrassing, particularly as his income fuelled a life-style. that was becoming less acceptable to society. What had once
appeared innovative and amusing now looked like an indulgence. The challenge now was for Hein to change his leadership
style. to suit the new situation. However, he ultimately failed to do this. Like many leaders who have risen to their position
through entrepreneurial ability and a dominant spirit, the concept of serving stakeholders rather than ordering them around
proved too difficult to grasp. The sensible thing would have been to leave Rock Bottom and start afresh. However, like many
entrepreneurs he was emotionally attached to the company and so he persuaded a group of private equity financiers to help
him buy it back. Combining the roles of Chairman and Chief Executive Officer (CEO) is also controversial and likely to attract
criticism concerning corporate governance.

In summary, in the second phase of Hein’s leadership he failed to change his approach to reflect changing social values, a
maturing product/service market-place and the need to serve new and important stakeholders in the organisation. He clearly
saw the public limited company as a ‘shackle’ on his ambition and its obligations an infringement of his personal privacy.
It can be argued that Hein took Rock Bottom back into private ownership just as the product life cycle moved into its decline
stage. The product life cycle is a timely reminder that any product or service has a finite life. Forty years earlier, as a young
man, Hein was in touch with the technological and social changes that created a demand for his product and service.
However, he had now lost touch with the forces shaping the external environment. Products have now moved on. Music is
increasingly delivered through downloaded files that are then played through computers (for home use) or MP3s (for portable
use). Even where consumers use traditional electronic equipment, the reliability of this equipment means that it is seldom
replaced. The delivery method, through specialised shops, which once seemed so innovative is now widely imitated and
increasingly, due to the Internet, less cost-effective. Consumers of these products are knowledgeable buyers and are only
willing to purchase, after careful cost and delivery comparisons, through the Internet. Hence, Hein is in a situation where he
faces more competition to supply products which are used and replaced less frequently, using a sales channel that is
increasingly uncompetitive. Consequently, Hein’s attempt to re-vitalise the shops by using the approach he adopted in phase
1 of the company was always doomed to failure. This failure was also guaranteed by the continued presence of the managers
appointed in phase 2 of the company. These were managers used to tight controls and targets set by centralised management.
To suddenly be let loose was not what they wanted and Hein appears to have reacted to their inability to act entrepreneurially
with anger and abuse. Hein’s final acts of reinvention concerned the return to a hedonistic, conspicuous life style. that he had
enjoyed in the early days of the company. He probably felt that this was possible now that he did not have the reporting
requirements of the public limited company. However, he had failed to recognise significant changes in society. He celebrated
the freeing of ‘Rock Bottom from its shackles’ by throwing a large celebration party. Celebrities were flown in from all over the
world to attend. It seems inevitable that the cost and carbon footprint of such an event would now attract criticism.
Finally, in summary, Hein’s approach and leadership style. in phase 3 became increasingly out of step with society’s
expectations, customers’ requirements and employees’ expectations. However, unlike phase 2, Hein was now free of the
responsibilities and controls of professional management in a public limited company. This led him to conspicuous activities
that further devalued the brand, meaning that its demise was inevitable.

(b) At the end of the first phase Hein still had managers who were entrepreneurial in their outlook. It might have been attractive
for them to become franchisees, particularly as this might be a way of protecting their income through the more challenging
stages of the product and service life cycle that lay ahead. However, by the time Hein came to look at franchising again (phase
3), the managers were unlikely to be of the type that would take up the challenge of running a franchise. These were
managers used to meeting targets within the context of centrally determined policies and budgets within a public limited
company. Hein would have to make these employees redundant (at significant cost) and with no certainty that he could find
franchisees to replace them.
At the end of phase 1, Rock Bottom was a strong brand, associated with youth and innovation. First movers often retain
customer loyalty even when their products and approach have been imitated by new aggressive entrants to the market. A
strong brand is essential for a successful franchise as it is a significant part of what the franchisee is buying. However, by the
time Hein came to look at franchising again in phase 3, the brand was devalued by his behaviour and incongruent with
customer expectations and sales channels. For example, it had no Internet sales channel. If Hein had developed Rock Bottom
as a franchise it would have given him the opportunity to focus on building the brand, rather than financing the expansion
of the business through the issue of shares.
At the end of phase 1, Rock Bottom was still a financially successful company. If it had been franchised at this point, then
Hein could have realised some of his investment (through franchise fees) and used some of this to reward himself, and the
rest of the money could have been used to consolidate the brand. Much of the future financial risk would have been passed
to the franchisees. There would have been no need to take Rock Bottom public and so suffer the scrutiny associated with a
public limited company. However, by the time Hein came to look at franchising again in phase 3, most of the shops were
trading at a loss. He saw franchising as a way of disposing of the company in what he hoped was a sufficiently well-structured
way. In effect, it was to minimise losses. It seems highly unlikely that franchisees would have been attracted by investing in
something that was actually making a loss. Even if they were, it is unlikely that the franchise fees (and hence the money
immediately realised) would be very high.


(c) Comment on the matters to be considered in seeking to determine the extent of Indigo Co’s financial loss

resulting from the alleged fraud. (6 marks)

正确答案:
(c) Extent of alleged fraud – Matters to be considered
■ Details reported to police: The managing director may have made some estimate of the possible extent of the fraud in
reporting the chief accountant’s disappearance to the police.
■ The minimum loss (assuming no insurance) would be sales for the three days before he left. If not known (e.g. because
the only record of them was in the cash book) a simple estimate might be 3/20 × total recorded revenue for a typical
month.
■ The pattern of cash bankings extracted from bank statements: A falling trend starting during the year might mark the
time from which the chief accountant began to misappropriate cash.
■ Whether other managers have voiced their suspicions, if any, on the chief accountant’s behaviour. For example, if there
was any marked change in his lifestyle. (what he appeared to spend his money on, the hours he worked, etc).
■ The prior year auditor’s report was unmodified. If this was appropriate the chief accountant’s alleged fraudulent activities
may have only started in the current year.
■ The amount of fidelity insurance cover (i.e. against employees handling cash) that Indigo has taken out to meet any
claim for fraud.
■ The likelihood, if any, of recovering misappropriated amounts. For example, if the chief accountant has assets (e.g. a
house) that can be used to settle Indigo’s claims against him in the event that he is caught/successfully prosecuted.

(ii) Can we entertain our clients as a gesture of goodwill or is corporate hospitality ruled out? (3 marks)

Required:

For EACH of the three FAQs, explain the threats to objectivity that may arise and the safeguards that should

be available to manage them to an acceptable level.

NOTE: The mark allocation is shown against each of the three questions.

正确答案:
(ii) Corporate hospitality
A partner in an audit firm is obviously in a position to influence the conduct and outcome of an audit. Therefore a
partner being on ‘too friendly’ terms with an audit client creates a familiarity threat. Other members of the audit team
may not exert as much influence on the audit.
A self-interest threat may also be perceived (e.g. if corporate hospitality is provided to keep a prestigious client).
There is no absolute prohibition against corporate hospitality provided:
■ the value attached to such hospitality is ‘insignificant’; and
■ the ‘frequency, nature and cost’ of the hospitality is reasonable.
Thus, flying the directors of an audit client for weekends away could be seen as significant. Similarly, entertaining an
audit client on a regular basis could be seen as unacceptable.
Partners and staff of Boleyn will need to be objective in their assessments of the significance or reasonableness of the
hospitality offered. (Would ‘a reasonable and informed third party’ conclude that the hospitality will or is likely to be
seen to impair your objectivity?)
If they have any doubts they should discuss the matter in the first instance with the audit engagement partner, who
should refer the matter to the ethics partner if in doubt.

There has been significant divergence in practice over recognition of revenue mainly because International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) have contained limited guidance in certain areas. The International Accounting Standards Board (IASB) as a result of the joint project with the US Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) has issued IFRS 15 Revenue from Contracts with Customers. IFRS 15 sets out a five-step model, which applies to revenue earned from a contract with a customer with limited exceptions, regardless of the type of revenue transaction or the industry. Step one in the five-step model requires the identification of the contract with the customer and is critical for the purpose of applying the standard. The remaining four steps in the standard’s revenue recognition model are irrelevant if the contract does not fall within the scope of IFRS 15.

Required:

(a) (i) Discuss the criteria which must be met for a contract with a customer to fall within the scope of IFRS 15. (5 marks)

(ii) Discuss the four remaining steps which lead to revenue recognition after a contract has been identified as falling within the scope of IFRS 15. (8 marks)

(b) (i) Tang enters into a contract with a customer to sell an existing printing machine such that control of the printing machine vests with the customer in two years’ time. The contract has two payment options. The customer can pay $240,000 when the contract is signed or $300,000 in two years’ time when the customer gains control of the printing machine. The interest rate implicit in the contract is 11·8% in order to adjust for the risk involved in the delay in payment. However, Tang’s incremental borrowing rate is 5%. The customer paid $240,000 on 1 December 2014 when the contract was signed. (4 marks)

(ii) Tang enters into a contract on 1 December 2014 to construct a printing machine on a customer’s premises for a promised consideration of $1,500,000 with a bonus of $100,000 if the machine is completed within 24 months. At the inception of the contract, Tang correctly accounts for the promised bundle of goods and services as a single performance obligation in accordance with IFRS 15. At the inception of the contract, Tang expects the costs to be $800,000 and concludes that it is highly probable that a significant reversal in the amount of cumulative revenue recognised will occur. Completion of the printing machine is highly susceptible to factors outside of Tang’s influence, mainly issues with the supply of components.

At 30 November 2015, Tang has satisfied 65% of its performance obligation on the basis of costs incurred to date and concludes that the variable consideration is still constrained in accordance with IFRS 15. However, on 4 December 2015, the contract is modified with the result that the fixed consideration and expected costs increase by $110,000 and $60,000 respectively. The time allowable for achieving the bonus is extended by six months with the result that Tang concludes that it is highly probable that the bonus will be achieved and that the contract still remains a single performance obligation. Tang has an accounting year end of 30 November. (6 marks)

Required:

Discuss how the above two contracts should be accounted for under IFRS 15. (In the case of (b)(i), the discussion should include the accounting treatment up to 30 November 2016 and in the case of (b)(ii), the accounting treatment up to 4 December 2015.)

Note: The mark allocation is shown against each of the items above.

Professional marks will be awarded in question 4 for clarity and quality of presentation. (2 marks)

正确答案:

(a) (i) The definition of what constitutes a contract for the purpose of applying the standard is critical. The definition of contract is based on the definition of a contract in the USA and is similar to that in IAS 32 Financial Instruments: Presentation. A contract exists when an agreement between two or more parties creates enforceable rights and obligations between those parties. The agreement does not need to be in writing to be a contract but the decision as to whether a contractual right or obligation is enforceable is considered within the context of the relevant legal framework of a jurisdiction. Thus, whether a contract is enforceable will vary across jurisdictions. The performance obligation could include promises which result in a valid expectation that the entity will transfer goods or services to the customer even though those promises are not legally enforceable.

The first criteria set out in IFRS 15 is that the parties should have approved the contract and are committed to perform. their respective obligations. It would be questionable whether that contract is enforceable if this were not the case. In the case of oral or implied contracts, this may be difficult but all relevant facts and circumstances should be considered in assessing the parties’ commitment. The parties need not always be committed to fulfilling all of the obligations under a contract. IFRS 15 gives the example where a customer is required to purchase a minimum quantity of goods but past experience shows that the customer does not always do this and the other party does not enforce their contract rights. However, there needs to be evidence that the parties are substantially committed to the contract.

It is essential that each party’s rights and the payment terms can be identified regarding the goods or services to be transferred. This latter requirement is the key to determining the transaction price.

The contract must have commercial substance before revenue can be recognised, as without this requirement, entities might artificially inflate their revenue and it would be questionable whether the transaction has economic consequences. Further, it should be probable that the entity will collect the consideration due under the contract. An assessment of a customer’s credit risk is an important element in deciding whether a contract has validity but customer credit risk does not affect the measurement or presentation of revenue. The consideration may be different to the contract price because of discounts and bonus offerings. The entity should assess the ability of the customer to pay and the customer’s intention to pay the consideration. If a contract with a customer does not meet these criteria, the entity can continually re-assess the contract to determine whether it subsequently meets the criteria.

Two or more contracts which are entered into around the same time with the same customer may be combined and accounted for as a single contract, if they meet the specified criteria. The standard provides detailed requirements for contract modifications. A modification may be accounted for as a separate contract or a modification of the original contract, depending upon the circumstances of the case.

(ii) Step one in the five-step model requires the identification of the contract with the customer. After a contract has been determined to fall under IFRS 15, the following steps are required before revenue can be recognised.

Step two requires the identification of the separate performance obligations in the contract. This is often referred to as ’unbundling’, and is done at the beginning of a contract. The key factor in identifying a separate performance obligation is the distinctiveness of the good or service, or a bundle of goods or services. A good or service is distinct if the customer can benefit from the good or service on its own or together with other readily available resources and is separately identifiable from other elements of the contract. IFRS 15 requires a series of distinct goods or services which are substantially the same with the same pattern of transfer, to be regarded as a single performance obligation. A good or service, which has been delivered, may not be distinct if it cannot be used without another good or service which has not yet been delivered. Similarly, goods or services which are not distinct should be combined with other goods or services until the entity identifies a bundle of goods or services which is distinct. IFRS 15 provides indicators rather than criteria to determine when a good or service is distinct within the context of the contract. This allows management to apply judgement to determine the separate performance obligations which best reflect the economic substance of a transaction.

Step three requires the entity to determine the transaction price, which is the amount of consideration which an entity expects to be entitled to in exchange for the promised goods or services. This amount excludes amounts collected on behalf of a third party, for example, government taxes. An entity must determine the amount of consideration to which it expects to be entitled in order to recognise revenue.

The transaction price might include variable or contingent consideration. Variable consideration should be estimated as either the expected value or the most likely amount. Management should use the approach which it expects will best predict the amount of consideration and should be applied consistently throughout the contract. An entity can only include variable consideration in the transaction price to the extent that it is highly probable that a subsequent change in the estimated variable consideration will not result in a significant revenue reversal. If it is not appropriate to include all of the variable consideration in the transaction price, the entity should assess whether it should include part of the variable consideration. However, this latter amount still has to pass the ’revenue reversal’ test.

Additionally, an entity should estimate the transaction price taking into account non-cash consideration, consideration payable to the customer and the time value of money if a significant financing component is present. The latter is not required if the time period between the transfer of goods or services and payment is less than one year. If an entity anticipates that it may ultimately accept an amount lower than that initially promised in the contract due to, for example, past experience of discounts given, then revenue would be estimated at the lower amount with the collectability of that lower amount being assessed. Subsequently, if revenue already recognised is not collectable, impairment losses should be taken to profit or loss.

Step four requires the allocation of the transaction price to the separate performance obligations. The allocation is based on the relative standalone selling prices of the goods or services promised and is made at inception of the contract. It is not adjusted to reflect subsequent changes in the standalone selling prices of those goods or services. The best evidence of standalone selling price is the observable price of a good or service when the entity sells that good or service separately. If that is not available, an estimate is made by using an approach which maximises the use of observable inputs. For example, expected cost plus an appropriate margin or the assessment of market prices for similar goods or services adjusted for entity-specific costs and margins or in limited circumstances a residual approach. When a contract contains more than one distinct performance obligation, an entity allocates the transaction price to each distinct performance obligation on the basis of the standalone selling price.

Where the transaction price includes a variable amount and discounts, consideration needs to be given as to whether these amounts relate to all or only some of the performance obligations in the contract. Discounts and variable consideration will typically be allocated proportionately to all of the performance obligations in the contract. However, if certain conditions are met, they can be allocated to one or more separate performance obligations.

Step five requires revenue to be recognised as each performance obligation is satisfied. An entity satisfies a performance obligation by transferring control of a promised good or service to the customer, which could occur over time or at a point in time. The definition of control includes the ability to prevent others from directing the use of and obtaining the benefits from the asset. A performance obligation is satisfied at a point in time unless it meets one of three criteria set out in IFRS 15. Revenue is recognised in line with the pattern of transfer.

If an entity does not satisfy its performance obligation over time, it satisfies it at a point in time and revenue will be recognised when control is passed at that point in time. Factors which may indicate the passing of control include the present right to payment for the asset or the customer has legal title to the asset or the entity has transferred physical possession of the asset.

(b) (i) The contract contains a significant financing component because of the length of time between when the customer pays for the asset and when Tang transfers the asset to the customer, as well as the prevailing interest rates in the market. A contract with a customer which has a significant financing component should be separated into a revenue component (for the notional cash sales price) and a loan component. Consequently, the accounting for a sale arising from a contract which has a significant financing component should be comparable to the accounting for a loan with the same features. An entity should use the discount rate which would be reflected in a separate financing transaction between the entity and its customer at contract inception. The interest rate implicit in the transaction may be different from the rate to be used to discount the cash flows, which should be the entity’s incremental borrowing rate. IFRS 15 would therefore dictate that the rate which should be used in adjusting the promised consideration is 5%, which is the entity’s incremental borrowing rate, and not 11·8%.

Tang would account for the significant financing component as follows:

Recognise a contract liability for the $240,000 payment received on 1 December 2014 at the contract inception:

Dr Cash $240,000
Cr Contract liability $240,000

During the two years from contract inception (1 December 2014) until the transfer of the printing machine, Tang adjusts the amount of consideration and accretes the contract liability by recognising interest on $240,000 at 5% for two years.

Year to 30 November 2015
Dr Interest expense $12,000
Cr Contract liability $12,000

Contract liability would stand at $252,000 at 30 November 2015.

Year to 30 November 2016
Dr Interest expense $12,600
Cr Contract liability $12,600

Recognition of contract revenue on transfer of printing machine at 30 November 2016 of $264,600 by debiting contract liability and crediting revenue with this amount.

(ii) Tang accounts for the promised bundle of goods and services as a single performance obligation satisfied over time in accordance with IFRS 15. At the inception of the contract, Tang expects the following:

Transaction price $1,500,000
Expected costs $800,000
Expected profit (46·7%) $700,000

At contract inception, Tang excludes the $100,000 bonus from the transaction price because it cannot conclude that it is highly probable that a significant reversal in the amount of cumulative revenue recognised will not occur. Completion of the printing machine is highly susceptible to factors outside the entity’s influence. By the end of the first year, the entity has satisfied 65% of its performance obligation on the basis of costs incurred to date. Costs incurred to date are therefore $520,000 and Tang reassesses the variable consideration and concludes that the amount is still constrained. Therefore at 30 November 2015, the following would be recognised:

Revenue $975,000
Costs $520,000
Gross profit $455,000

However, on 4 December 2015, the contract is modified. As a result, the fixed consideration and expected costs increase by $110,000 and $60,000, respectively. The total potential consideration after the modification is $1,710,000 which is $1,610,000 fixed consideration + $100,000 completion bonus. In addition, the allowable time for achieving the bonus is extended by six months with the result that Tang concludes that it is highly probable that including the bonus in the transaction price will not result in a significant reversal in the amount of cumulative revenue recognised in accordance with IFRS 15. Therefore the bonus of $100,000 can be included in the transaction price. Tang also concludes that the contract remains a single performance obligation. Thus,Tang accounts for the contract modification as if it were part of the original contract. Therefore, Tang updates its estimates of costs and revenue as follows:

Tang has satisfied 60·5% of its performance obligation ($520,000 actual costs incurred compared to $860,000 total expected costs). The entity recognises additional revenue of $59,550 [(60·5% of $1,710,000) – $975,000 revenue recognised to date] at the date of the modification as a cumulative catch-up adjustment. As the contract amendment took place after the year end, the additional revenue would not be treated as an adjusting event.


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