信息!关于如何快速成为ACCA持证会员?来看看!

发布时间:2020-05-04


对于现在来讲,报考ACCA考生越来越多,那么ACCA如何才能成为持证会员呢?接下来看看吧!

关于 ACCA会员无论是在中国,还是在国际上都有着非常可观的就业前景和地位,很多在职人士甚至是在读大学生都想依靠ACCA来为自己“镀金”,增加竞争力,需要满足哪些考试和要求?

首先,如何才能成为ACCA会员? 

通过ACCA专业资格大纲13门课程的考试;    至少三年的相关工作经验;    完成在线职业操守训练课程的学习和测试即可成为会员。  

如何快速成为ACCA会员?   

 ACCA分为随时机考和分季机考两种考试政策,应用知识课程为随时机考,学员可随时报考,应用技能课程和战略课程均为分季机考,学员可在每年3/6/9/12月进行报考,一次性可报考四科,一年最多不超过8科。

按照一般的备考时间来算,大约一年半的时间就可通过所有科目的考试,成为ACCA准会员。此时,在学习期间,完成ACCA对学员工作经验方面的要求即可在备考后立即成为ACCA会员了。  

 符合会员的必要条件”3E”的准会员可以直接登陆ACCA网站下载填写《ACCA会员申请表》。对于暂时未满足会员的必要条件的准会员,可以在条件满足的任何时间向ACCA递交ACCA会员申请表。

ACCA总部将对会员申请材料进行审核,完全符合条件者将被批准成为ACCA会员,并会收到ACCA英国总部颁发的ACCA会员证书。

根据往年ACCA考试成绩公布规律来看,ACCA官方通常会在考试后的第40天公布本次考试成绩。现如今ACCA考生成绩已经公布。

学员捷报纷纷传来,班主任老师一直在接收来自学员的好消息。并且整理了部分通过学员的喜讯,大家快来一起看看吧,考试成绩查询端口一开放,就有学员给网校老师发来消息,很不错了,真是“明明可以靠脸吃饭,却偏偏靠自己的学识渊博”的实证。

还记得上次考试成绩公布的时候,那个微博热搜的ACCA,成为热门话题靠什么?靠的是实力,ACCA成绩公布之日,自然是网校学员报喜之时。

有些同学的画风好像有点不太一样,学了ACCA后,真的是相当的傲娇,学员喜报陆续更新中,网校向通过本次考试的学员表示祝贺,同时也预祝各位准备参加考试的学员顺利通过ACCA

以上就是关于考试的全部内容了,如果想要了解更多关于考试的信息,大家可以来关注51题库考试学习网哦,51题库考试学习网每天会为大家更新和考试相关的内容的。


下面小编为大家准备了 ACCA考试 的相关考题,供大家学习参考。

(d) Player trading

Another proposal is for the club to sell its two valuable players, Aldo and Steel. It is thought that it will receive a

total of $16 million for both players. The players are to be offered for sale at the end of the current football season

on 1 May 2007. (5 marks)

Required:

Discuss how the above proposals would be dealt with in the financial statements of Seejoy for the year ending

31 December 2007, setting out their accounting treatment and appropriateness in helping the football club’s

cash flow problems.

(Candidates do not need knowledge of the football finance sector to answer this question.)

正确答案:


This scenario summarises the development of a company called Rock Bottom through three phases, from its founding in 1965 to 2008 when it ceased trading.

Phase 1 (1965–1988)

In 1965 customers usually purchased branded electrical goods, largely produced by well-established domestic companies, from general stores that stocked a wide range of household products. However, in that year, a recent university graduate, Rick Hein, established his first shop specialising solely in the sale of electrical goods. In contrast to the general stores, Rick Hein’s shop predominantly sold imported Japanese products which were smaller, more reliable and more sophisticated than the products of domestic competitors. Rick Hein quickly established a chain of shops, staffed by young people who understood the capabilities of the products they were selling. He backed this up with national advertising in the press, an innovation at the time for such a specialist shop. He branded his shops as ‘Rock Bottom’, a name which specifically referred to his cheap prices, but also alluded to the growing importance of

rock music and its influence on product sales. In 1969, 80% of sales were of music centres, turntables, amplifiers and speakers, bought by the newly affluent young. Rock Bottom began increasingly to specialise in selling audio equipment.

Hein also developed a high public profile. He dressed unconventionally and performed a number of outrageous stunts that publicised his company. He also encouraged the managers of his stores to be equally outrageous. He rewarded their individuality with high salaries, generous bonus schemes and autonomy. Many of the shops were extremely successful, making their managers (and some of their staff) relatively wealthy people.

However, by 1980 the profitability of the Rock Bottom shops began to decline significantly. Direct competitors using a similar approach had emerged, including specialist sections in the large general stores that had initially failed to react to the challenge of Rock Bottom. The buying public now expected its electrical products to be cheap and reliable.

Hein himself became less flamboyant and toned down his appearance and actions to satisfy the banks who were becoming an increasingly important source of the finance required to expand and support his chain of shops.

Phase 2 (1989–2002)

In 1988 Hein considered changing the Rock Bottom shops into a franchise, inviting managers to buy their own shops (which at this time were still profitable) and pursuing expansion though opening new shops with franchisees from outside the company. However, instead, he floated the company on the country’s stock exchange. He used some of the capital raised to expand the business. However, he also sold shares to help him throw the ‘party of a lifetime’ and to purchase expensive goods and gifts for his family. Hein became Chairman and Chief Executive Officer (CEO) of the newly quoted company, but over the next thirteen years his relationship with his board and shareholders became increasingly difficult. Gradually new financial controls and reporting systems were put in place. Most of the established managers left as controls became more centralised and formal. The company’s performance was solid but unspectacular. Hein complained that ‘business was not fun any more’. The company was legally required to publish directors’ salaries in its annual report and the generous salary package enjoyed by the Chairman and CEO increasingly became an issue and it dominated the 2002 Annual General Meeting (AGM). Hein was embarrassed by its publication and the discussion it led to in the national media. He felt that it was an infringement of his privacy and

civil liberties.

Phase 3 (2003–2008)

In 2003 Hein found the substantial private equity investment necessary to take Rock Bottom private again. He also used all of his personal fortune to help re-acquire the company from the shareholders. He celebrated ‘freeing Rock Bottom from its shackles’ by throwing a large celebration party. Celebrities were flown in from all over the world to attend. However, most of the new generation of store managers found Hein’s style. to be too loose and unfocused. He became rude and angry about their lack of entrepreneurial spirit. Furthermore, changes in products and how they were purchased meant that fewer people bought conventional audio products from specialist shops. The reliability of these products now meant that they were replaced relatively infrequently. Hein, belatedly, started to consider selling via an Internet site. Turnover and profitability plummeted. In 2007 Hein again considered franchising the company,but he realised that this was unlikely to be successful. In early 2008 the company ceased trading and Hein himself,now increasingly vilified and attacked by the press, filed for personal bankruptcy.

Required:

(a) Analyse the reasons for Rock Bottom’s success or failure in each of the three phases identified in the

scenario. Evaluate how Rick Hein’s leadership style. contributed to the success or failure of each phase.

(18 marks)

(b) Rick Hein considered franchising the Rock Bottom brand at two points in its history – 1988 and 2007.

Explain the key factors that would have made franchising Rock Bottom feasible in 1988, but would have

made it ‘unlikely to be successful’ in 2007. (7 marks)

正确答案:

(a) The product life cycle model suggests that a product passes through six stages: introduction, development, growth, shakeout,
maturity and decline. The first Rock Bottom phase appears to coincide with the introduction, development and growth periods
of the products offered by the company. These highly specified, high quality products were new to the country and were
quickly adopted by a certain consumer segment (see below). The life cycle concept also applies to services, and the innovative
way in which Rock Bottom sold and marketed the products distinguished the company from potential competitors. Not only
were these competitors still selling inferior and older products but their retail methods looked outdated compared with Rock Bottom’s bright, specialist shops. Rock Bottom’s entry into the market-place also exploited two important changes in the
external environment. The first was the technological advance of the Japanese consumer electronics industry. The second
was the growing economic power of young people, who wished to spend their increasing disposable income on products that
allowed them to enjoy popular music. Early entrants into an industry gain experience of that industry sooner than others. This
may not only be translated into cost advantages but also into customer loyalty that helps them through subsequent stages of
the product’s life cycle. Rock Bottom enjoyed the advantages of a first mover in this industry.
Hein’s leadership style. appears to have been consistent with contemporary society and more than acceptable to his young
target market. As an entrepreneur, his charismatic leadership was concerned with building a vision for the organisation and
then energising people to achieve it. The latter he achieved through appointing branch managers who reflected, to some
degree, his own style. and approach. His willingness to delegate considerable responsibility to these leaders, and to reward
them well, was also relatively innovative. The shops were also staffed by young people who understood the capabilities of the
products they were selling. It was an early recognition that intangible resources of skills and knowledge were important to the
organisation.
In summary, in the first phase Rock Bottom’s organisation and Hein’s leadership style. appear to have been aligned with
contemporary society, the customer base, employees and Rock Bottom’s position in the product/service life cycle.
The second phase of the Rock Bottom story appears to reflect the shakeout and maturity phases of the product life cycle. The
entry of competitors into the market is a feature of the growth stage. However, it is in the shakeout stage that the market
becomes saturated with competitors. The Rock Bottom product and service approach is easily imitated. Hein initially reacted
to these new challenges by a growing maturity, recognising that outrageous behaviour might deter the banks from lending to
him. However, the need to raise money to fund expansion and a latent need to realise (and enjoy) his investment led to the
company being floated on the country’s stock exchange. This, eventually, created two problems.
The first was the need for the company to provide acceptable returns to shareholders. This would have been a new challenge
for Hein. He would have to not only maintain dividends to external shareholders, but he would also have to monitor and
improve the publicly quoted share price. In an attempt to establish an organisation that could deliver such value, changes
were made in the organisational structure and style. Most of the phase 1 entrepreneur-style. managers left. This may have
been inevitable anyway as Rock Bottom would have had problems continuing with such high individual reward packages in
a maturing market. However, the new public limited organisation also demanded managers who were more transactional
leaders, focusing on designing systems and controlling performance. This style. of management was alien to Rick’s approach.
The second problem was the need for the organisation to become more transparent. The publishing of Hein’s financial details
was embarrassing, particularly as his income fuelled a life-style. that was becoming less acceptable to society. What had once
appeared innovative and amusing now looked like an indulgence. The challenge now was for Hein to change his leadership
style. to suit the new situation. However, he ultimately failed to do this. Like many leaders who have risen to their position
through entrepreneurial ability and a dominant spirit, the concept of serving stakeholders rather than ordering them around
proved too difficult to grasp. The sensible thing would have been to leave Rock Bottom and start afresh. However, like many
entrepreneurs he was emotionally attached to the company and so he persuaded a group of private equity financiers to help
him buy it back. Combining the roles of Chairman and Chief Executive Officer (CEO) is also controversial and likely to attract
criticism concerning corporate governance.

In summary, in the second phase of Hein’s leadership he failed to change his approach to reflect changing social values, a
maturing product/service market-place and the need to serve new and important stakeholders in the organisation. He clearly
saw the public limited company as a ‘shackle’ on his ambition and its obligations an infringement of his personal privacy.
It can be argued that Hein took Rock Bottom back into private ownership just as the product life cycle moved into its decline
stage. The product life cycle is a timely reminder that any product or service has a finite life. Forty years earlier, as a young
man, Hein was in touch with the technological and social changes that created a demand for his product and service.
However, he had now lost touch with the forces shaping the external environment. Products have now moved on. Music is
increasingly delivered through downloaded files that are then played through computers (for home use) or MP3s (for portable
use). Even where consumers use traditional electronic equipment, the reliability of this equipment means that it is seldom
replaced. The delivery method, through specialised shops, which once seemed so innovative is now widely imitated and
increasingly, due to the Internet, less cost-effective. Consumers of these products are knowledgeable buyers and are only
willing to purchase, after careful cost and delivery comparisons, through the Internet. Hence, Hein is in a situation where he
faces more competition to supply products which are used and replaced less frequently, using a sales channel that is
increasingly uncompetitive. Consequently, Hein’s attempt to re-vitalise the shops by using the approach he adopted in phase
1 of the company was always doomed to failure. This failure was also guaranteed by the continued presence of the managers
appointed in phase 2 of the company. These were managers used to tight controls and targets set by centralised management.
To suddenly be let loose was not what they wanted and Hein appears to have reacted to their inability to act entrepreneurially
with anger and abuse. Hein’s final acts of reinvention concerned the return to a hedonistic, conspicuous life style. that he had
enjoyed in the early days of the company. He probably felt that this was possible now that he did not have the reporting
requirements of the public limited company. However, he had failed to recognise significant changes in society. He celebrated
the freeing of ‘Rock Bottom from its shackles’ by throwing a large celebration party. Celebrities were flown in from all over the
world to attend. It seems inevitable that the cost and carbon footprint of such an event would now attract criticism.
Finally, in summary, Hein’s approach and leadership style. in phase 3 became increasingly out of step with society’s
expectations, customers’ requirements and employees’ expectations. However, unlike phase 2, Hein was now free of the
responsibilities and controls of professional management in a public limited company. This led him to conspicuous activities
that further devalued the brand, meaning that its demise was inevitable.

(b) At the end of the first phase Hein still had managers who were entrepreneurial in their outlook. It might have been attractive
for them to become franchisees, particularly as this might be a way of protecting their income through the more challenging
stages of the product and service life cycle that lay ahead. However, by the time Hein came to look at franchising again (phase
3), the managers were unlikely to be of the type that would take up the challenge of running a franchise. These were
managers used to meeting targets within the context of centrally determined policies and budgets within a public limited
company. Hein would have to make these employees redundant (at significant cost) and with no certainty that he could find
franchisees to replace them.
At the end of phase 1, Rock Bottom was a strong brand, associated with youth and innovation. First movers often retain
customer loyalty even when their products and approach have been imitated by new aggressive entrants to the market. A
strong brand is essential for a successful franchise as it is a significant part of what the franchisee is buying. However, by the
time Hein came to look at franchising again in phase 3, the brand was devalued by his behaviour and incongruent with
customer expectations and sales channels. For example, it had no Internet sales channel. If Hein had developed Rock Bottom
as a franchise it would have given him the opportunity to focus on building the brand, rather than financing the expansion
of the business through the issue of shares.
At the end of phase 1, Rock Bottom was still a financially successful company. If it had been franchised at this point, then
Hein could have realised some of his investment (through franchise fees) and used some of this to reward himself, and the
rest of the money could have been used to consolidate the brand. Much of the future financial risk would have been passed
to the franchisees. There would have been no need to take Rock Bottom public and so suffer the scrutiny associated with a
public limited company. However, by the time Hein came to look at franchising again in phase 3, most of the shops were
trading at a loss. He saw franchising as a way of disposing of the company in what he hoped was a sufficiently well-structured
way. In effect, it was to minimise losses. It seems highly unlikely that franchisees would have been attracted by investing in
something that was actually making a loss. Even if they were, it is unlikely that the franchise fees (and hence the money
immediately realised) would be very high.


(b) How could pursuing a corporate environmental strategy both add to CFS’s competitive advantage and be

socially responsible? (5 marks)

正确答案:
(b) Increasingly, firms are becoming aware of their social responsibility and their need to develop strategies that are designed to
meet this responsibility. Such responsibility can take many forms and is not a new phenomenon – many 19th century firms
looked after the housing, education and health needs of the communities where they were located. Michael Porter and Claas
van der Linde in their article ‘Green and competitive’ show how the traditional view that there is ‘an inherent and fixed tradeoff:
ecology versus economy’ is incorrect. This traditional view sees the benefits of government imposed environmental
standards, causing industry’s private costs of prevention and clean up – ‘costs that cause higher prices and reduced
competitiveness’. Porter and Linde argue that with properly designed and implemented environmental standards, firms will
be encouraged to produce innovations that use a range of inputs more efficiently, e.g. energy, labour, raw materials, and in
so doing increase resource productivity and in offsetting the costs of environmental improvement make industry more not less
competitive. All too often in their opinion, companies resort to fighting environmental control through the courts rather than
using innovation to increase resource productivity and meet environmental standards – ‘environmental strategies must
become an issue for general managers’.
CFS are, therefore, correct in seeing environmental standards as a positive step towards becoming more not less competitive.
Key stakeholders in the form. of both government and customers are looking to their suppliers to become more ‘green’. These
challenges are increasingly international and global. Building in positive environmental strategies can help CFS differentiate
itself and through improved resource productivity become more competitive. Clearly, they will need the environmental
scanning devices to become aware of environmental legislation and change. Awareness then can lead to analysis in the
monitoring of macro environmental challenges and the development of a SWOT analysis to match the company’s strengths
and weaknesses against the threats and opportunities created by environmental standards. Tools of strategic analysis such as
PEST, five forces and value chain analysis lend themselves to understanding the significance of the environmental change
and how it can stimulate innovation and, through innovation, competitive advantage.

(c) In April 2006, Keffler was banned by the local government from emptying waste water into a river because the

water did not meet minimum standards of cleanliness. Keffler has made a provision of $0·9 million for the

technological upgrading of its water purifying process and included $45,000 for the penalties imposed in ‘other

provisions’. (5 marks)

Required:

For each of the above issues:

(i) comment on the matters that you should consider; and

(ii) state the audit evidence that you should expect to find,

in undertaking your review of the audit working papers and financial statements of Keffler Co for the year ended

31 March 2006.

NOTE: The mark allocation is shown against each of the three issues.

正确答案:
(c) Ban on emptying waste water
(i) Matter
■ $0·9m provision for upgrading the process represents 45% PBT and is very material. This provision is also
material to the balance sheet (2·7% of total assets).
■ The provision for penalties is immaterial (2·2% PBT and 0·1% total assets).
■ The ban is an adjusting post balance sheet event in respect of the penalties (IAS 10). It provides evidence that at
the balance sheet date Keffler was in contravention of local government standards. Therefore it is correct (in
accordance with IAS 37) that a provision has been made for the penalties. As the matter is not material inclusion
in ‘other provisions’ is appropriate.
■ However, even if Keffler has a legal obligation to meet minimum standards, there is no obligation for upgrading the
purifying process at 31 March 2006 and the $0·9m provision should be written back.
■ If the provision for upgrading is not written back the audit opinion should be qualified ‘except for’ (disagreement).
■ Keffler does not even have a contingent liability for upgrading the process because there is no present obligation to
do so. The obligation is to stop emptying unclean water into the river. Nor is there a possible obligation whose
existence will be confirmed by an uncertain future event not wholly within Keffler’s control.
Tutorial note: Consider that Keffler has alternatives wholly within its control. For example, it could ignore the ban
and incur fines, or relocate/close this particular plant/operation or perhaps dispose of the water by alternative
means.
■ The need for a technological upgrade may be an indicator of impairment. Management should have carried out
an impairment test on the carrying value of the water purifying process and recognised any impairment loss in the
profit for the year to 31 March 2006.
■ Management’s intention to upgrade the process is more appropriate to an environmental responsibility report (if
any).
■ Whether there is any other information in documents containing financial statements.
(ii) Audit evidence
■ Penalty notices of fines received to confirm amounts and period/dates covered.
■ After-date payment of fines agreed to the cash book.
■ A copy of the ban and any supporting report on the local government’s findings.
■ Minutes of board meetings at which the ban was discussed confirming management’s intentions (e.g. to upgrade
the process).
Tutorial note: This may be disclosed in the directors’ report and/or as a non-adjusting post balance sheet event.
■ Any tenders received/costings for upgrading.
Tutorial note: This will be relevant if, for example, capital commitment authorised (by the board) but not
contracted for at the year end are disclosed in the notes to the financial statements.
■ Physical inspection of the emptying point at the river to confirm that Keffler is not still emptying waste water into
it (unless the upgrading has taken place).
Tutorial note: Thereby incurring further penalties.

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