最近准备学习ACCA，想提前了解一下报考条件是...

正确答案：
(d) It is not possible to combine the reserves as suggested. IAS1 Presentation of financial statements requires retained earnings
to be shown seperately from other reserves.

正确答案：
(b) Directors’ retirement benefits
The directors’ retirement benefits are unfunded plans which may fall under IAS19 ‘Employee Benefits’.
Sirus should review its contractual or constructive obligation to make retirement benefit payments to its former directors at the
time when they leave the firm. The payments may create a financial liability under IAS32, or may give rise to a liability of
uncertain timing and amount which may fall within the scope of IAS37 ‘Provisions, contingent liabilities and contingent
assets’. Certain former directors are paid a fixed annuity for a fixed term which is payable annually, and on death, the present
value of future payments are paid to the director’s estate. An annuity meets the definition of a financial liability under IAS32,
if there is a contractual obligation to deliver cash or a financial asset. The latter form. of annuity falls within the scope of
IAS32/39. The present value of the annuity payments should be determined. The liability is recognised because the directors
have a contractual right to the annuity and the firm has no discretion in terms of withholding the payment. As the rights to
the annuities are earned over the period of the service of the directors, then the costs should have been recognised also over
the service period.
Where an annuity has a life contingent element and, therefore, embodies a mortality risk, it falls outside the scope of IAS39
because the annuity will meet the definition of an insurance contract which is scoped out of IAS39, along with employers’
rights and obligations under IAS19. Such annuities will, therefore, fall within the scope of IAS37 if a constructive obligation
exists. Sirus should assess the probability of the future cash outflow of the present obligation. Because there are a number of
similar obligations, IAS37 requires that the class of obligations as a whole should be considered (similar to a warranty
provision). A provision should be made for the best estimate of the costs of the annuity and this would include any liability
for post retirement payments to directors earned to date. The liability should be built up over the service period rather than
just when the director leaves. In practice the liability will be calculated on an actuarial basis consistent with the principles in
IAS19. The liability should be recalculated on an annual basis, as for any provision, to take account of changes in directors
and other factors. The liability will be discounted where the effect is material.

正确答案：
(a)Roleofinternalandexternalauditors–differencesObjectivesThemainobjectiveofinternalauditistoimproveacompany’soperations,primarilyintermsofvalidatingtheefficiencyandeffectivenessoftheinternalcontrolsystemsofacompany.Themainobjectiveoftheexternalauditoristoexpressanopiniononthetruthandfairnessofthefinancialstatements,andotherjurisdictionspecificrequirementssuchasconfirmingthatthefinancialstatementscomplywiththereportingrequirementsincludedinlegislation.ReportingInternalauditreportsarenormallyaddressedtotheboardofdirectors,orotherpeoplechargedwithgovernancesuchastheauditcommittee.Thosereportsarenotpubliclyavailable,beingconfidentialbetweentheinternalauditorandtherecipient.Externalauditreportsareprovidedtotheshareholdersofacompany.Thereportisattachedtotheannualfinancialstatementsofthecompanyandisthereforepubliclyavailabletotheshareholdersandanyreaderofthefinancialstatements.ScopeofworkTheworkoftheinternalauditornormallyrelatestotheoperationsoftheorganisation,includingthetransactionprocessingsystemsandthesystemstoproducetheannualfinancialstatements.Theinternalauditormayalsoprovideotherreportstomanagement,suchasvalueformoneyauditswhichexternalauditorsrarelybecomeinvolvedwith.Theworkoftheexternalauditorrelatesonlytothefinancialstatementsoftheorganisation.However,theinternalcontrolsystemsoftheorganisationwillbetestedastheseprovideevidenceonthecompletenessandaccuracyofthefinancialstatements.RelationshipwithcompanyInmostorganisations,theinternalauditorisanemployeeoftheorganisation,whichmayhaveanimpactontheauditor’sindependence.However,insomeorganisationstheinternalauditfunctionisoutsourced.Theexternalauditorisappointedbytheshareholdersofanorganisation,providingsomedegreeofindependencefromthecompanyandmanagement.(b)BenefitsofauditcommitteeinConoyCoAssistancewithfinancialreporting(nofinanceexpertise)TheexecutivedirectorsofConoyCodonotappeartohaveanyspecificfinancialskills–asthefinancialdirectorhasrecentlyleftthecompanyandhasnotyetbeenreplaced.ThismaymeanthatfinancialreportinginConoyCoislimitedorthattheothernon-financialdirectorsspendasignificantamountoftimekeepinguptodateonfinancialreportingissues.AnauditcommitteewillassistConoyCobyprovidingspecialistknowledgeoffinancialreportingonatemporarybasis–atleastoneofthenewappointeesshouldhaverelevantandrecentfinancialreportingexperienceundercodesofcorporategovernance.ThiswillallowtheexecutivedirectorstofocusonrunningConoyCo.EnhanceinternalcontrolsystemsTheboardofConoyCodonotnecessarilyunderstandtheworkoftheinternalauditor,ortheneedforcontrolsystems.ThismeansthatinternalcontrolwithinConoyComaybeinadequateorthatemployeesmaynotrecognisetheimportanceofinternalcontrolsystemswithinanorganisation.TheauditcommitteecanraiseawarenessoftheneedforgoodinternalcontrolsystemssimplybybeingpresentinConoyCoandbyeducatingtheboardontheneedforsoundcontrols.Improvingtheinternalcontrol‘climate’willensuretheneedforinternalcontrolsisunderstoodandreducecontrolerrors.RelianceonexternalauditorsConoyCo’sinternalauditorscurrentlyreporttotheboardofConoyCo.Aspreviouslynoted,thelackoffinancialandcontrolexpertiseontheboardwillmeanthatexternalauditorreportsandadvicewillnotnecessarilybeunderstood–andtheboardmayrelytoomuchonexternalauditorsIfConoyCoreporttoanauditcommitteethiswilldecreasethedependenceoftheboardontheexternalauditors.Theauditcommitteecantaketimetounderstandtheexternalauditor’scomments,andthenviathenon-executivedirector,ensurethattheboardtakeactiononthosecomments.AppointmentofexternalauditorsAtpresent,theboardofConoyCoappointtheexternalauditors.Thisraisesissuesofindependenceastheboardmaybecometoofamiliarwiththeexternalauditorsandsoappointonthisfriendshipratherthanmerit.Ifanauditcommitteeisestablished,thenthiscommitteecanrecommendtheappointmentoftheexternalauditors.Thecommitteewillhavethetimeandexpertisetoreviewthequalityofserviceprovidedbytheexternalauditors,removingtheindependenceissue.Corporategovernancerequirements–bestpracticeConoyCodonotneedtofollowcorporategovernancerequirements(thecompanyisnotlisted).However,notfollowingthoserequirementsmaystarttohaveadverseeffectsonConoy.Forexample,ConoyCo’sbankisalreadyconcernedaboutthelackoftransparencyinreporting.EstablishinganauditcommitteewillshowthattheboardofConoyCoarecommittedtomaintainingappropriateinternalsystemsinthecompanyandprovidingthestandardofreportingexpectedbylargecompanies.Obtainingthenewbankloanshouldalsobeeasierasthebankwillbesatisfiedwithfinancialreportingstandards.Givennonon-executives–independentadvicetoboardCurrentlyConoyCodoesnothaveanynon-executivedirectors.Thismeansthatthedecisionsoftheexecutivedirectorsarenotbeingchallengedbyotherdirectorsindependentofthecompanyandwithlittleornofinancialinterestinthecompany.Theappointmentofanauditcommitteewithonenon-executivedirectorontheboardofConoyCowillstarttoprovidesomenon-executiveinputtoboardmeetings.Whilenotsufficientintermsofcorporategovernancerequirements(aboutequalnumbersofexecutiveandnon-executivedirectorsareexpected)itdoesshowtheboardofConoyCoareattemptingtoestablishappropriategovernancesystems.AdviceonriskmanagementFinally,thereareothergeneralareaswhereConoyCowouldbenefitfromanauditcommittee.Forexample,lackofcorporategovernancestructuresprobablymeansConoyCodoesnothaveariskmanagementcommittee.Theauditcommitteecanalsoprovideadviceonriskmanagement,helpingtodecreasetheriskexposureofthecompany.