2020年ACCA考试财务会计（基础阶段）财经词汇汇总11

3 ALBREDA CO

(a) Cessation of ‘home delivery’ service
(i) Matters
■ $0·6 million represents 1·4% of reported revenue (prior year 1·9%) and is therefore material.
Tutorial note: However, it is clearly not of such significance that it should raise any doubts whatsoever regarding
the going concern assumption. (On the contrary, as revenue from this service has declined since last year.)
■ The home delivery service is not a component of Albreda and its cessation does not classify as a discontinued
operation (IFRS 5 ‘Non-current Assets Held for Sale and Discontinued Operations’).
? It is not a cash-generating unit because home delivery revenues are not independent of other revenues
generated by the restaurant kitchens.
? 1·4% of revenue is not a ‘major line of business’.
? Home delivery does not cover a separate geographical area (but many areas around the numerous
restaurants).
■ The redundancy provision of $0·2 million represents 11·1% of profit before tax (10% before allowing for the
provision) and is therefore material. However, it represents only 0·6% of total assets and is therefore immaterial
to the balance sheet.
■ As the provision is a liability it should have been tested primarily for understatement (completeness).
■ The delivery vehicles should be classified as held for sale if their carrying amount will be recovered principally
through a sale transaction rather than through continuing use. For this to be the case the following IFRS 5 criteria
must be met:
? the vehicles must be available for immediate sale in their present condition; and
? their sale must be highly probable.
Tutorial note: Highly probable = management commitment to a plan + initiation of plan to locate buyer(s) +
active marketing + completion expected in a year.
■ However, even if the classification as held for sale is appropriate the measurement basis is incorrect.
■ Non-current assets classified as held for sale should be carried at the lower of carrying amount and fair value less
costs to sell.
■ It is incorrect that the vehicles are being measured at fair value less costs to sell which is $0·3 million in excess
of the carrying amount. This amounts to a revaluation. Wherever the credit entry is (equity or income statement)
it should be reversed. $0·3 million represents just less than 1% of assets (16·7% of profit if the credit is to the
income statement).
■ Comparison of fair value less costs to sell against carrying amount should have been made on an item by item
basis (and not on their totals).
(ii) Audit evidence
■ Copy of board minute documenting management’s decision to cease home deliveries (and any press
releases/internal memoranda to staff).
■ An analysis of revenue (e.g. extracted from management accounts) showing the amount attributed to home delivery
sales.
■ Redundancy terms for drivers as set out in their contracts of employment.
■ A ‘proof in total’ for the reasonableness/completeness of the redundancy provision (e.g. number of drivers × sum
of years employed × payment per year of service).
■ A schedule of depreciated cost of delivery vehicles extracted from the non-current asset register.
■ Checking of fair values on a sample basis to second hand market prices (as published/advertised in used vehicle
guides).
■ After-date net sale proceeds from sale of vehicles and comparison of proceeds against estimated fair values.
■ Physical inspection of condition of unsold vehicles.
■ Separate disclosure of the held for sale assets on the face of the balance sheet or in the notes.
■ Assets classified as held for sale (and other disposals) shown in the reconciliation of carrying amount at the
beginning and end of the period.
■ Additional descriptions in the notes of:
? the non-current assets; and
? the facts and circumstances leading to the sale/disposal (i.e. cessation of home delivery service).

(ii) As far as annual agreements relating to property work are concerned, HLP had a take up rate of 82·5% whereas MAS
had a take up rate of only 50%. Therefore, HLP has ‘lost out’ to competitor MAS in relative financial terms as regards
the ‘take-up’ of consultations relating to property work. This is because both HLP and MAS received an annual fee from
each property client irrespective of the number of consultations given. MAS should therefore have had a better profit
margin from this area of business than HLP. However, the extent to which HLP has ‘lost out’ cannot be quantified since
we would need to know the variable costs per consultation and this detail is not available. What we do know is that
HLP earned actual revenue per effective consultation amounting to ￡90·90 whereas the budgeted revenue per
consultation amounted to ￡100. MAS earned ￡120 per effective consultation.
The same picture emerges from annual agreements relating to commercial work. HLP had a budgeted take up rate of
50%, however the actual take up rate during the period was 90%. MAS had an actual take up rate of 50%. The actual
revenue per effective consultation earned by HLP amounted to ￡167 whereas the budgeted revenue per consultation
amounted to ￡300. MAS earned ￡250 per effective consultation.
There could possibly be an upside to this situation for HLP in that it might be the case that the uptake of 90% of
consultations without further charge by clients holding annual agreements in respect of commercial work might be
indicative of a high level of customer satisfaction. It could on the other hand be indicative of a mindset which says ‘I
have already paid for these consultations therefore I am going to request them’.
(iii) Budgeted and actual salaries in HLP were ￡50,000 per annum, per advisor. Two additional advisors were employed
during the year in order to provide consultations in respect of commercial work. MAS paid a salary of ￡60,000 to each
advisor which is 20% higher than the salary of ￡50,000 paid to each advisor by HLP. Perhaps this is indicative that
the advisors employed by MAS are more experienced and/or better qualified than those employed by HLP.
HLP paid indemnity insurance of ￡250,000 which is ￡150,000 (150%) more than the amount of ￡100,000 paid by
MAS. This excess cost may well have arisen as a consequence of successful claims against HLP for negligence in
undertaking commercial work. It would be interesting to know whether HLP had been the subject of any successful
claims for negligent work during recent years as premiums invariably reflect the claims history of a business. Rather
worrying is the fact that HLP was subject to three such claims during the year ended 31 May 2007.
Significant subcontract costs were incurred by HLP during the year probably in an attempt to satisfy demand and retain
the goodwill of its clients. HLP incurred subcontract costs in respect of commercial properties which totalled ￡144,000.
These consultations earned revenue amounting to (320 x ￡150) = ￡48,000, hence a loss of ￡96,000 was incurred
in this area of the business.
HLP also paid ￡300,000 for 600 subcontract consultations in respect of litigation work. These consultations earned
revenue amounting to (600 x ￡250) = ￡150,000, hence a loss of ￡150,000 was incurred in this area of the business.
In contrast, MAS paid ￡7,000 for 20 subcontract consultations in respect of commercial work and an identical amount
for 20 subcontract consultations in respect of litigation work. These consultations earned revenue amounting to
20 x (￡150 + ￡200) =￡7,000. Therefore, a loss of only ￡7,000 was incurred in respect of subcontract consultations
by MAS.
Other operating expenses were budgeted at 53·0% of sales revenue. The actual level incurred was 40·7% of sales
revenue. The fixed/variable split of such costs is not given but it may well be the case that the fall in this percentage is
due to good cost control by HLP. However, it might simply be the case that the original budget was flawed. Competitor
MAS would appear to have a slightly superior cost structure to that of HLP since its other operating expenses amounted
to 38·4% of sales revenue. Further information is required in order to draw firmer conclusions regarding cost control
within both businesses.