青海省考生想知道ACCA的科目F3怎么备考？

正确答案：
(b) (i) RESPONSIBILITY is the liability of a person to be called to account for their actions and results, and is therefore an obligation to take some action to discharge that responsibility. Unlike authority, responsibility cannot be delegated. There is however some discussion on the extent to which this statement is true: the idea that responsibility cannot be delegated is too simplistic. Any task contains an element of responsibility. It is the idea of accountability and the direction of responsibility that is the relevant concept and is the problem at Flavours Fine Foods; ultimate responsibility resides with the owners. It is self evident that it is impossible to exercise authority without responsibility because this could lead to problems of control and therefore undesirable outcomes for the organisation. However, the superior (the owner) is always ultimately responsible for the actions of his or her subordinates. The key element here is the recognition of discretion by virtue of the person’s position. This underlines the doctrine of absolute responsibility; the superior is always ultimately accountable.

正确答案：
(c) Corporate governance provisions varying by country
There is a debate about the extent to which corporate governance provisions (in the form. of either written codes, laws or
general acceptances) should be global or whether they should vary to account for local differences. In this answer, Vincent
Viola’s view is critically evaluated.
In general terms, corporate governance provisions vary depending on such factors as local business culture, businesses’
capital structures, the extent of development of capital funding of businesses and the openness of stock markets. In Germany,
for example, companies have traditionally drawn much of their funding from banks thereby reducing their dependence on
shareholders’ equity. Stock markets in the Soviet Union are less open and less liquid than those in the West. In many
developing countries, business activity is concentrated among family-owned enterprises.
Against Vincent’s view
Although business cultures vary around the world, all business financed by private capital have private shareholders. Any
dilution of the robustness of provisions may ignore the needs of local investors to have their interests adequately represented.
This dilution, in turn, may allow bad practice, when present, to exist and proliferate.
Some countries suffer from a poor reputation in terms of endemic corruption and fraud and any reduction in the rigour with
which corporate governance provisions are implemented fail to address these shortcomings, notwithstanding the fact that they
might be culturally unexpected or difficult to implement.
In terms of the effects of macroeconomic systems, Vincent’s views ignore the need for sound governance systems to underpin
confidence in economic systems. This is especially important when inward investment needs are considered as the economic
wealth of affected countries are partly underpinned by the robustness, or not, of their corporate governance systems.
Supporting Vincent’s view
In favour of Vincent’s view are a number of arguments. Where local economies are driven more by small family businesses
and less by public companies, accountability relationships are quite different (perhaps the ‘family reasons’ referred to in the
case) and require a different type of accounting and governance.
There is a high compliance and monitoring cost to highly structured governance regimes that some developing countries may
deem unnecessary to incur.
There is, to some extent, a link between the stage of economic development and the adoption of formal governance codes.
It is generally accepted that developing countries need not necessarily observe the same levels of formality in governance as
more mature, developed economies.
Some countries’ governments may feel that they can use the laxity of their corporate governance regimes as a source of
international comparative advantage. In a ‘race to the bottom’, some international companies seeking to minimise the effects
of structured governance regimes on some parts of their operations may seek countries with less tight structures for some
operations.

正确答案：
(c) Non-consolidated entities under common control
■ Horizontal groups of entities under common control were a significant feature of the Enron and Parmalat business
empires.
■ Such business empires increase audit risk as fraud is often disguised through labyrinthine group structures. Hence
auditors need to understand and confirm the economic purpose of entities within business empires (as well as special
purpose entities (SPEs) and non-trading entities).
■ Horizontal groups fall outside the requirement for the preparation of group accounts. It is not only finance that is offbalance
sheet when controlled entities are excluded from consolidated financial statements.
■ In the absence of consolidated financial statements, users of accounts of entities in horizontal groups have to rely on the
disclosure of related party transactions and control relationships for information about transactions and arrangements
with other group entities. Difficulties faced by auditors include:
? failing to detect related party transactions and control relationships;
? not understanding the substance of transactions with entities under common control;
? excessively creative tax planning;
? the implications of transfer pricing (e.g. failure to recognise profits unrealised at the business empire level);
? a lack of access to relevant confidential information held by others;
? relying on representations made in good faith by those whom the auditors believe manage the company when
control rests elsewhere.
■ Audit work is inevitably increased if an auditor is put upon inquiry to investigate dubious transactions and arrangements.
However, the complexity of business empires across multiple jurisdictions with different auditors may deter auditors from
liaising with other auditors (especially where legal or professional confidentiality considerations prevent this).

正确答案：

(a) To: David Silvester
From:
Funding strategy for Gift Designs Ltd
Clearly, you have identified a real business opportunity and face both business and financial risks in turning the opportunity
into reality. One possible model you can use is that of the product life cycle which as a one-product firm is effectively the life
cycle for the company. Linking business risk to financial risk is important – in the early stages of the business the business
risk is high and the high death rate amongst new start-ups is well publicised and, consequently, there is a need to go for low
financial risk. Funding the business is essentially deciding the balance between debt and equity finance, and equity offers the
low risk that you should be looking for. As the firm grows and develops so the balance between debt and equity will change.
A new business venture like this could in Boston Box terms be seen as a problem child with a non-existent market share but
high growth potential. The business risks are very high and consequently the financial risks taken should be very low and
avoid taking on large amounts of debt with a commitment to service the debt.
You need to take advantage of investors who are willing to accept the risks associated with a business start-up – venture
capitalists and business angels accept the risks associated with putting equity capital in but may expect a significant share
in the ownership of the business. This they will seek to realise once the business is successfully established. As the business
moves into growth and then maturity so the business risks will reduce and access to debt finance becomes feasible and cost
effective. In maturity the business should be able to generate significant retained earnings to finance further development.

Dividend policy will also be affected by the stage in the life cycle that the business has reached.
Yours,