必须看!2020年ACCA考试教材变化预测

发布时间:2020-03-01


随着新年的到来,许多小伙伴也开始为考试做准备。比如,有网友就在网上询问2020ACCA考试教材与去年相比是否会有变化。鉴于此,51题库考试学习网在下面为大家带来ACCA考试教材的相关信息,以供参考。

通常而言,ACCA教材是每年换一次的,一般78月份出。在大纲不换的情况下,每年的教材内容变化不大。ACCA考试在2018年进行了一次大纲变动,因此2020年的教材与去年相比变化不大。不过,ACCA考试教材的配套练习册是半年换一次,23月和78月,与考试同步。配套练习册每次的变化就是加入上一次考试的试题,并且删除一些以前的试题,总的收录试题数差不多。但是对于学员备考有很好的的参考价值。

  说完教材,我们再来看看ACCA考试内容变化。ACCA大概四五年换一次大纲,每次大纲转变后有些课可能会被取消,然后有些新的课程会加进去。比如说,2007年底就进行了一次大纲转换,主要的就是2.1取消了,增加了F5-绩效管理以及Core Paper由以前的3.53.63.7变成了现在的P3P2P1,从次序大家就能看出,现在需要先考core paper,后考optional等。也就是ACCA现在实行的考试制度。

 值得一提的是,ACCA2018年就把P1P3取消了,改为一个新科目SBLP2改为一个新科目SBR。那么对应的教材练习册都会发生相应的变化。请各位ACCA学员注意。

以上就是关于ACCA考试教材的相关情况。51题库考试学习网提醒:每年ACCA教材内容变化内容不大,但是练习册都会发生一定的变化,小伙伴们要注意购买最新教材进行备考哦。最后,51题库考试学习网预祝准备参加2020ACCA考试的小伙伴都能顺利通过。


下面小编为大家准备了 ACCA考试 的相关考题,供大家学习参考。

(ii) Calculate the probability of the net profit being less than £75 million. (2 marks)

正确答案:


You are an audit manager responsible for providing hot reviews on selected audit clients within your firm of Chartered

Certified Accountants. You are currently reviewing the audit working papers for Pulp Co, a long standing audit client,

for the year ended 31 January 2008. The draft statement of financial position (balance sheet) of Pulp Co shows total

assets of $12 million (2007 – $11·5 million).The audit senior has made the following comment in a summary of

issues for your review:

‘Pulp Co’s statement of financial position (balance sheet) shows a receivable classified as a current asset with a value

of $25,000. The only audit evidence we have requested and obtained is a management representation stating the

following:

(1) that the amount is owed to Pulp Co from Jarvis Co,

(2) that Jarvis Co is controlled by Pulp Co’s chairman, Peter Sheffield, and

(3) that the balance is likely to be received six months after Pulp Co’s year end.

The receivable was also outstanding at the last year end when an identical management representation was provided,

and our working papers noted that because the balance was immaterial no further work was considered necessary.

No disclosure has been made in the financial statements regarding the balance. Jarvis Co is not audited by our firm

and we have verified that Pulp Co does not own any shares in Jarvis Co.’

Required:

(b) In relation to the receivable recognised on the statement of financial position (balance sheet) of Pulp Co as

at 31 January 2008:

(i) Comment on the matters you should consider. (5 marks)

正确答案:
(b) (i) Matters to consider
Materiality
The receivable represents only 0·2% (25,000/12 million x 100) of total assets so is immaterial in monetary terms.
However, the details of the transaction could make it material by nature.
The amount is outstanding from a company under the control of Pulp Co’s chairman. Readers of the financial statements
would be interested to know the details of this transaction, which currently is not disclosed. Elements of the transaction
could be subject to bias, specifically the repayment terms, which appear to be beyond normal commercial credit terms.
Paul Sheffield may have used his influence over the two companies to ‘engineer’ the transaction. Disclosure is necessary
due to the nature of the transaction, the monetary value is irrelevant.
A further matter to consider is whether this is a one-off transaction, or indicative of further transactions between the two
companies.
Relevant accounting standard
The definitions in IAS 24 must be carefully considered to establish whether this actually constitutes a related party
transaction. The standard specifically states that two entities are not necessarily related parties just because they have
a director or other member of key management in common. The audit senior states that Jarvis Co is controlled by Peter
Sheffield, who is also the chairman of Pulp Co. It seems that Peter Sheffield is in a position of control/significant influence
over the two companies (though this would have to be clarified through further audit procedures), and thus the two
companies are likely to be perceived as related.
IAS 24 requires full disclosure of the following in respect of related party transactions:
– the nature of the related party relationship,
– the amount of the transaction,
– the amount of any balances outstanding including terms and conditions, details of security offered, and the nature
of consideration to be provided in settlement,
– any allowances for receivables and associated expense.
There is currently a breach of IAS 24 as no disclosure has been made in the notes to the financial statements. If not
amended, the audit opinion on the financial statements should be qualified with an ‘except for’ disagreement. In
addition, if practicable, the auditor’s report should include the information that would have been included in the financial
statements had the requirements of IAS 24 been adhered to.
Valuation and classification of the receivable
A receivable should only be recognised if it will give rise to future economic benefit, i.e. a future cash inflow. It appears
that the receivable is long outstanding – if the amount is unlikely to be recovered then it should be written off as a bad
debt and the associated expense recognised. It is possible that assets and profits are overstated.
Although a representation has been received indicating that the amount will be paid to Pulp Co, the auditor should be
sceptical of this claim given that the same representation was given last year, and the amount was not subsequently
recovered. The $25,000 could be recoverable in the long term, in which case the receivable should be reclassified as
a non-current asset. The amount advanced to Jarvis Co could effectively be an investment rather than a short term
receivable. Correct classification on the statement of financial position (balance sheet) is crucial for the financial
statements to properly show the liquidity position of the company at the year end.
Tutorial note: Digressions into management imposing a limitation in scope by withholding evidence are irrelevant in this
case, as the scenario states that the only evidence that the auditors have asked for is a management representation.
There is no indication in the scenario that the auditors have asked for, and been refused any evidence.

This scenario summarises the development of a company called Rock Bottom through three phases, from its founding in 1965 to 2008 when it ceased trading.

Phase 1 (1965–1988)

In 1965 customers usually purchased branded electrical goods, largely produced by well-established domestic companies, from general stores that stocked a wide range of household products. However, in that year, a recent university graduate, Rick Hein, established his first shop specialising solely in the sale of electrical goods. In contrast to the general stores, Rick Hein’s shop predominantly sold imported Japanese products which were smaller, more reliable and more sophisticated than the products of domestic competitors. Rick Hein quickly established a chain of shops, staffed by young people who understood the capabilities of the products they were selling. He backed this up with national advertising in the press, an innovation at the time for such a specialist shop. He branded his shops as ‘Rock Bottom’, a name which specifically referred to his cheap prices, but also alluded to the growing importance of

rock music and its influence on product sales. In 1969, 80% of sales were of music centres, turntables, amplifiers and speakers, bought by the newly affluent young. Rock Bottom began increasingly to specialise in selling audio equipment.

Hein also developed a high public profile. He dressed unconventionally and performed a number of outrageous stunts that publicised his company. He also encouraged the managers of his stores to be equally outrageous. He rewarded their individuality with high salaries, generous bonus schemes and autonomy. Many of the shops were extremely successful, making their managers (and some of their staff) relatively wealthy people.

However, by 1980 the profitability of the Rock Bottom shops began to decline significantly. Direct competitors using a similar approach had emerged, including specialist sections in the large general stores that had initially failed to react to the challenge of Rock Bottom. The buying public now expected its electrical products to be cheap and reliable.

Hein himself became less flamboyant and toned down his appearance and actions to satisfy the banks who were becoming an increasingly important source of the finance required to expand and support his chain of shops.

Phase 2 (1989–2002)

In 1988 Hein considered changing the Rock Bottom shops into a franchise, inviting managers to buy their own shops (which at this time were still profitable) and pursuing expansion though opening new shops with franchisees from outside the company. However, instead, he floated the company on the country’s stock exchange. He used some of the capital raised to expand the business. However, he also sold shares to help him throw the ‘party of a lifetime’ and to purchase expensive goods and gifts for his family. Hein became Chairman and Chief Executive Officer (CEO) of the newly quoted company, but over the next thirteen years his relationship with his board and shareholders became increasingly difficult. Gradually new financial controls and reporting systems were put in place. Most of the established managers left as controls became more centralised and formal. The company’s performance was solid but unspectacular. Hein complained that ‘business was not fun any more’. The company was legally required to publish directors’ salaries in its annual report and the generous salary package enjoyed by the Chairman and CEO increasingly became an issue and it dominated the 2002 Annual General Meeting (AGM). Hein was embarrassed by its publication and the discussion it led to in the national media. He felt that it was an infringement of his privacy and

civil liberties.

Phase 3 (2003–2008)

In 2003 Hein found the substantial private equity investment necessary to take Rock Bottom private again. He also used all of his personal fortune to help re-acquire the company from the shareholders. He celebrated ‘freeing Rock Bottom from its shackles’ by throwing a large celebration party. Celebrities were flown in from all over the world to attend. However, most of the new generation of store managers found Hein’s style. to be too loose and unfocused. He became rude and angry about their lack of entrepreneurial spirit. Furthermore, changes in products and how they were purchased meant that fewer people bought conventional audio products from specialist shops. The reliability of these products now meant that they were replaced relatively infrequently. Hein, belatedly, started to consider selling via an Internet site. Turnover and profitability plummeted. In 2007 Hein again considered franchising the company,but he realised that this was unlikely to be successful. In early 2008 the company ceased trading and Hein himself,now increasingly vilified and attacked by the press, filed for personal bankruptcy.

Required:

(a) Analyse the reasons for Rock Bottom’s success or failure in each of the three phases identified in the

scenario. Evaluate how Rick Hein’s leadership style. contributed to the success or failure of each phase.

(18 marks)

(b) Rick Hein considered franchising the Rock Bottom brand at two points in its history – 1988 and 2007.

Explain the key factors that would have made franchising Rock Bottom feasible in 1988, but would have

made it ‘unlikely to be successful’ in 2007. (7 marks)

正确答案:

(a) The product life cycle model suggests that a product passes through six stages: introduction, development, growth, shakeout,
maturity and decline. The first Rock Bottom phase appears to coincide with the introduction, development and growth periods
of the products offered by the company. These highly specified, high quality products were new to the country and were
quickly adopted by a certain consumer segment (see below). The life cycle concept also applies to services, and the innovative
way in which Rock Bottom sold and marketed the products distinguished the company from potential competitors. Not only
were these competitors still selling inferior and older products but their retail methods looked outdated compared with Rock Bottom’s bright, specialist shops. Rock Bottom’s entry into the market-place also exploited two important changes in the
external environment. The first was the technological advance of the Japanese consumer electronics industry. The second
was the growing economic power of young people, who wished to spend their increasing disposable income on products that
allowed them to enjoy popular music. Early entrants into an industry gain experience of that industry sooner than others. This
may not only be translated into cost advantages but also into customer loyalty that helps them through subsequent stages of
the product’s life cycle. Rock Bottom enjoyed the advantages of a first mover in this industry.
Hein’s leadership style. appears to have been consistent with contemporary society and more than acceptable to his young
target market. As an entrepreneur, his charismatic leadership was concerned with building a vision for the organisation and
then energising people to achieve it. The latter he achieved through appointing branch managers who reflected, to some
degree, his own style. and approach. His willingness to delegate considerable responsibility to these leaders, and to reward
them well, was also relatively innovative. The shops were also staffed by young people who understood the capabilities of the
products they were selling. It was an early recognition that intangible resources of skills and knowledge were important to the
organisation.
In summary, in the first phase Rock Bottom’s organisation and Hein’s leadership style. appear to have been aligned with
contemporary society, the customer base, employees and Rock Bottom’s position in the product/service life cycle.
The second phase of the Rock Bottom story appears to reflect the shakeout and maturity phases of the product life cycle. The
entry of competitors into the market is a feature of the growth stage. However, it is in the shakeout stage that the market
becomes saturated with competitors. The Rock Bottom product and service approach is easily imitated. Hein initially reacted
to these new challenges by a growing maturity, recognising that outrageous behaviour might deter the banks from lending to
him. However, the need to raise money to fund expansion and a latent need to realise (and enjoy) his investment led to the
company being floated on the country’s stock exchange. This, eventually, created two problems.
The first was the need for the company to provide acceptable returns to shareholders. This would have been a new challenge
for Hein. He would have to not only maintain dividends to external shareholders, but he would also have to monitor and
improve the publicly quoted share price. In an attempt to establish an organisation that could deliver such value, changes
were made in the organisational structure and style. Most of the phase 1 entrepreneur-style. managers left. This may have
been inevitable anyway as Rock Bottom would have had problems continuing with such high individual reward packages in
a maturing market. However, the new public limited organisation also demanded managers who were more transactional
leaders, focusing on designing systems and controlling performance. This style. of management was alien to Rick’s approach.
The second problem was the need for the organisation to become more transparent. The publishing of Hein’s financial details
was embarrassing, particularly as his income fuelled a life-style. that was becoming less acceptable to society. What had once
appeared innovative and amusing now looked like an indulgence. The challenge now was for Hein to change his leadership
style. to suit the new situation. However, he ultimately failed to do this. Like many leaders who have risen to their position
through entrepreneurial ability and a dominant spirit, the concept of serving stakeholders rather than ordering them around
proved too difficult to grasp. The sensible thing would have been to leave Rock Bottom and start afresh. However, like many
entrepreneurs he was emotionally attached to the company and so he persuaded a group of private equity financiers to help
him buy it back. Combining the roles of Chairman and Chief Executive Officer (CEO) is also controversial and likely to attract
criticism concerning corporate governance.

In summary, in the second phase of Hein’s leadership he failed to change his approach to reflect changing social values, a
maturing product/service market-place and the need to serve new and important stakeholders in the organisation. He clearly
saw the public limited company as a ‘shackle’ on his ambition and its obligations an infringement of his personal privacy.
It can be argued that Hein took Rock Bottom back into private ownership just as the product life cycle moved into its decline
stage. The product life cycle is a timely reminder that any product or service has a finite life. Forty years earlier, as a young
man, Hein was in touch with the technological and social changes that created a demand for his product and service.
However, he had now lost touch with the forces shaping the external environment. Products have now moved on. Music is
increasingly delivered through downloaded files that are then played through computers (for home use) or MP3s (for portable
use). Even where consumers use traditional electronic equipment, the reliability of this equipment means that it is seldom
replaced. The delivery method, through specialised shops, which once seemed so innovative is now widely imitated and
increasingly, due to the Internet, less cost-effective. Consumers of these products are knowledgeable buyers and are only
willing to purchase, after careful cost and delivery comparisons, through the Internet. Hence, Hein is in a situation where he
faces more competition to supply products which are used and replaced less frequently, using a sales channel that is
increasingly uncompetitive. Consequently, Hein’s attempt to re-vitalise the shops by using the approach he adopted in phase
1 of the company was always doomed to failure. This failure was also guaranteed by the continued presence of the managers
appointed in phase 2 of the company. These were managers used to tight controls and targets set by centralised management.
To suddenly be let loose was not what they wanted and Hein appears to have reacted to their inability to act entrepreneurially
with anger and abuse. Hein’s final acts of reinvention concerned the return to a hedonistic, conspicuous life style. that he had
enjoyed in the early days of the company. He probably felt that this was possible now that he did not have the reporting
requirements of the public limited company. However, he had failed to recognise significant changes in society. He celebrated
the freeing of ‘Rock Bottom from its shackles’ by throwing a large celebration party. Celebrities were flown in from all over the
world to attend. It seems inevitable that the cost and carbon footprint of such an event would now attract criticism.
Finally, in summary, Hein’s approach and leadership style. in phase 3 became increasingly out of step with society’s
expectations, customers’ requirements and employees’ expectations. However, unlike phase 2, Hein was now free of the
responsibilities and controls of professional management in a public limited company. This led him to conspicuous activities
that further devalued the brand, meaning that its demise was inevitable.

(b) At the end of the first phase Hein still had managers who were entrepreneurial in their outlook. It might have been attractive
for them to become franchisees, particularly as this might be a way of protecting their income through the more challenging
stages of the product and service life cycle that lay ahead. However, by the time Hein came to look at franchising again (phase
3), the managers were unlikely to be of the type that would take up the challenge of running a franchise. These were
managers used to meeting targets within the context of centrally determined policies and budgets within a public limited
company. Hein would have to make these employees redundant (at significant cost) and with no certainty that he could find
franchisees to replace them.
At the end of phase 1, Rock Bottom was a strong brand, associated with youth and innovation. First movers often retain
customer loyalty even when their products and approach have been imitated by new aggressive entrants to the market. A
strong brand is essential for a successful franchise as it is a significant part of what the franchisee is buying. However, by the
time Hein came to look at franchising again in phase 3, the brand was devalued by his behaviour and incongruent with
customer expectations and sales channels. For example, it had no Internet sales channel. If Hein had developed Rock Bottom
as a franchise it would have given him the opportunity to focus on building the brand, rather than financing the expansion
of the business through the issue of shares.
At the end of phase 1, Rock Bottom was still a financially successful company. If it had been franchised at this point, then
Hein could have realised some of his investment (through franchise fees) and used some of this to reward himself, and the
rest of the money could have been used to consolidate the brand. Much of the future financial risk would have been passed
to the franchisees. There would have been no need to take Rock Bottom public and so suffer the scrutiny associated with a
public limited company. However, by the time Hein came to look at franchising again in phase 3, most of the shops were
trading at a loss. He saw franchising as a way of disposing of the company in what he hoped was a sufficiently well-structured
way. In effect, it was to minimise losses. It seems highly unlikely that franchisees would have been attracted by investing in
something that was actually making a loss. Even if they were, it is unlikely that the franchise fees (and hence the money
immediately realised) would be very high.


(b) Provide the directors of Acrux Ltd with a detailed explanation of the maximum rate of tax that will be suffered

on both the distributed and non-distributed profits of the non-UK resident investee companies where:

(1) there is a double tax treaty between the UK and the country in which the individual companies are

resident; and

(2) there is no such double tax treaty.

Note: you are not required to explain the position of the overseas resident branches. (6 marks)

正确答案:
(b) Rate of tax on profits of non-UK resident investee companies
Undistributed profits
The companies will be subject to tax in the countries in which they are resident; this is because of their residency status or
because they have a permanent establishment in that country. Undistributed profits will not be taxed in the UK.
The rate of tax on undistributed profits will therefore be the rate of tax in the country of residency of the respective companies.
Distributed profits with double tax treaty
The dividends received by Acrux Ltd from each of the overseas companies will be grossed up in respect of underlying tax (the
overseas corporation tax paid on the distributed profits) because Acrux Ltd will own at least 10% of the overseas companies.
The gross amount will then be included in Acrux Ltd’s profits chargeable to corporation tax.
The treaty will provide double tax relief in the UK for the overseas tax suffered in respect of each dividend up to a maximum
of the UK tax on the grossed up overseas dividend. As a result of the double tax relief, the overall rate of tax suffered will be
the higher of the UK rate paid by Acrux Ltd and the overseas tax rate borne by the overseas company.
Where the rate of overseas tax in respect of a particular dividend exceeds the rate of corporation tax in the UK, excess foreign
tax will arise. This can be relieved, via onshore pooling, against the UK tax due on those dividends where the rate of tax in
the UK exceeds the rate overseas. This will reduce the overall rate of tax suffered on the total overseas profits of the overseas
companies as a whole.
Distributed profits with no double tax treaty
Where there is no double tax treaty, unilateral double tax relief will be available in the UK. This relief will operate in the same
way as double tax relief under a double tax treaty such that the overall rate of tax on each dividend will be the higher of the
UK rate paid by Acrux Ltd and the overseas rate borne by the overseas company. Relief via onshore pooling will also be
available.

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