问答题

Passage 2　　The admission by the chief of the Pakistani Taleban, Baitullah Mehsud, that his group was behind Monday’s attack on a police academy in Lahore comes as little surprise.　　Analysts and officials said in the immediate aftermath of the attack that the most likely connection was with Mr. Mehsud’s Tehrik-e-Taleban (TeT) organisation.　　What has caught many off guard is how quickly and openly Mr. Mehsud accepted responsibility. Previously he and his organisation would either refrain from accepting responsibility for major attacks, or wait several months before acknowledging their role.　　It is another indication of how much the power of the Taleban has grown and how secure they feel in their safe havens along the border with Afghanistan.　　In particular, the Waziristan tribal region—part of which is controlled by Mr. Mehsud—stands out as the place which currently harbours some of the most wanted men in the world.　　For Pakistani security forces and the US, it has increasingly become centre stage in what was once called “the war on terror”.　　Everybody from Osama bin Laden to the trans-Atlantic bombing suspect, Rashid Rauf, has at one time or another said to have been based in this territory.　　If there is a place in the world which can continue to provide shelter for al-Qaeda, this is it. It is a land of steep mountains and narrow valleys populated by tribesmen proud of their long history of “dying gloriously” in battle.　　During the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, Waziristan remained the vanguard of the struggle. The first of the Afghan cities to be lost by the Soviets was to a commander from this region, when Khost fell to the now legendary Jalaluddin Haqqani.　　It is his son Sirajuddin who now heads the Afghan Taleban’s command in this region and the adjoining provinces of Afghanistan.　　He was recently declared wanted by the US with a reward of $ 5m for his capture.　　But the most famous and notorious of the Taleban warlords remains Baitullah Mehsud.　　He and his TeT organisation are responsible for much of the spread of Taleban ideology across Pakistan.　　Intelligence officials confirm that it was the help and training of TeT that enabled the Swat Taleban to demand and achieve a separate legal system in that Pakistani district.　　They also say that his support was crucial to the Taleban in nearby Bajaur, enabling them to reach a peace deal with the army despite the military having much of the upper hand.　　The TeT is also said to maintain networks as far afield as the southern port city of Karachi.　　Increasingly, it has grown as a clear and present danger to the state of Pakistan.　　But while the country’s security forces have been able to thwart Mr. Mehsud’s plans outside the tribal areas, it has been almost impossible to curtail his activities—and those of other Taleban leaders—in Waziristan.　　In a series of tactical campaigns, starting in 2004, the Taleban have all but pushed the security forces out of Waziristan. The few that remain are confined to their forts.　　Over the last year, the only thing that has penetrated the Waziristan tribal region are suspected US drones. These have killed hundreds of people, many of them militants, but also many civilians. That has angered ordinary Pakistanis and raised anti-American sentiments to an all-time high. Pakistan’s security forces say the drone strikes also prevent them from acting more strongly against the militants.　　In fact, other than killing a lot of junior and mid-level al-Qaeda and Taleban personnel, the attacks have united all Taleban factions in Pakistan.　　In a recent declaration, Pakistan’s other two Taleban factions—led by Maulvi Nazir and Hafiz Gul Bahadur-said they had formed an alliance with Mr. Mehsud.　　The two belong to the Ahmedzai Wazir tribe, the Mehsud’s traditional enemy.　　The Ahmedzai Wazir is the larger tribe and exists on both sides of the Pakistan-Afghanistan border. They are believed to harbour most of the senior al-Qaeda leadership, including Osama bin Laden and his deputy, Ayman al-Zawahiri.　　The harsh realities on the ground have made some analysts adamant that Pakistani and US authorities have little choice except direct military action in Waziristan.　　“This would mean bloody and entrenched fighting with serious losses against a battle-hardened enemy” says an ex-army official familiar with the region.　　Whether both sides are willing to take this on, in the face of declining public support for the conflict and its casualties, remains one of the great unanswered questions in this increasingly bloody war.　　1. What is the main difference in Mehsud accepting responsibilities between previous attacks and this one?　　2. What are the unexpected impacts that the US strikes in Waziristan have?　　3. Why does the author take the example of the legendary Jalaluddin Haqqani?