海南省考生想知道ACCA的科目F2怎么备考？

正确答案：

 

正确答案：
(b) Need to analyse the group structure
A certain amount of analysis of the group structure will be undertaken before an auditor accepts the role of group auditor,
particularly if the auditor is not directly responsible for the whole group.
An analysis of the group structure is necessary to:
■ ensure that particular attention is given to the more unusual aspects of corporate structures (e.g. partnership
arrangements that may be a joint venture, components in tax havens, shell companies and horizontal groups);
■ arrange access to information relating to all ‘significant’ components (i.e. those representing 20% or more of group
assets, liabilities, cash flows, profit or revenue), on a timely basis;
■ identify the applicable financial reporting framework for each component and any local statutory reporting requirements;
■ plan work to deal with different accounting frameworks/policies applied throughout the group and differences between
International Auditing Standards (ISAs) and national standards;
■ integrate the group audit process effectively with local statutory audit requirements;
■ identify related parties and effectively audit the completeness of disclosures in the group accounts in accordance with
IAS 24 Related Party Disclosures.
Any doubts about the group structure will need to be clarified against publicly available information as soon as possible to
ensure an effective audit of the relevant components (i.e. subsidiaries, associates and joint ventures). The auditor can then
plan the level of assurance required on each component well in advance of the year end.
Having established thoroughly the group structure from the outset the auditor will then need only to update the structure for
changes year-on-year.

正确答案：
(b) Critical success factors are as follows:
Product quality
The fact that the production staff have no previous experience in a food production environment is likely to prove problematic.
It is vital that a comprehensive training programme is put in place at the earliest opportunity. HSC need to reach and maintain
the highest level of product quality as soon as possible.
Supply quality
The quality of delivery into SFG supermarkets assumes critical significance. Time literally will be of the essence since 90%
of all sandwiches are sold in SFG’s supermarkets before 2 pm each day. Hence supply chain management must be extremely
robust as there is very little scope for error.
Technical quality
Compliance with existing regulations regarding food production including all relevant factory health and safety requirements
is vital in order to establish and maintain the reputation of HSC as a supplier of quality products. The ability to store products
at the correct temperature is critical because sandwiches are produced for human consumption and in extreme circumstance
could cause fatalities.
External credibility
Accreditation by relevant trade associations/regulators will be essential if nationwide acceptance of HSC as a major producer
of sandwiches is to be established.
New product development
Whilst HSC have developed a range of healthy eating sandwiches it must be recognised that consumer tastes change and
that in the face of competition there will always be a need for a continuous focus on new product development.
Margin
Whilst HSC need to recognise all other critical success factors they should always be mindful that the need to obtain the
desired levels of gross and net margin remain of the utmost importance.
Notes: (i) Only five critical success factors were required.
(ii) Alternative relevant discussion and examples would be acceptable.

正确答案：

(a) An annual cash flow account compares the estimated cash flows receivable from the property against the liabilities within the securitisation process. The swap introduces leverage into the arrangement.

The holders of the certificates are expected to receive $3·17million on $18 million, giving them a return of 17·6%. If the cash flows are 5% lower than the non-executive director has predicted, annual revenue received will fall to $20·90 million, reducing the balance available for the subordinated certificates to $2·07 million, giving a return of 11·5% on the subordinated certificates, which is below the returns offered on the B and C-rated loan notes. The point at which the holders of the certificates will receive nothing and below which the holders of the C-rated loan notes will not receive their full income will be an annual income of $18·83 million (a return of 9·4%), which is 14·4% less than the income that the non-executive director has forecast.

(b) Benefits

The finance costs of the securitisation may be lower than the finance costs of ordinary loan capital. The cash flows from the commercial property development may be regarded as lower risk than Moonstar Co’s other revenue streams. This will impact upon the rates that Moonstar Co is able to offer borrowers.

The securitisation matches the assets of the future cash flows to the liabilities to loan note holders. The non-executive director is assuming a steady stream of lease income over the next 10 years, with the development probably being close to being fully occupied over that period.

The securitisation means that Moonstar Co is no longer concerned with the risk that the level of earnings from the properties will be insufficient to pay the finance costs. Risks have effectively been transferred to the loan note holders.

Risks

Not all of the tranches may appeal to investors. The risk-return relationship on the subordinated certificates does not look very appealing, with the return quite likely to be below what is received on the C-rated loan notes. Even the C-rated loan note holders may question the relationship between the risk and return if there is continued uncertainty in the property sector.

If Moonstar Co seeks funding from other sources for other developments, transferring out a lower risk income stream means that the residual risks associated with the rest of Moonstar Co’s portfolio will be higher. This may affect the availability and terms of other borrowing.

It appears that the size of the securitisation should be large enough for the costs to be bearable. However Moonstar Co may face unforeseen costs, possibly unexpected management or legal expenses.

(c) (i) Sukuk finance could be appropriate for the securitisation of the leasing portfolio. An asset-backed Sukuk would be the same kind of arrangement as the securitisation, where assets are transferred to a special purpose vehicle and the returns and repayments are directly financed by the income from the assets. The Sukuk holders would bear the risks and returns of the relationship.

The other type of Sukuk would be more like a sale and leaseback of the development. Here the Sukuk holders would be guaranteed a rental, so it would seem less appropriate for Moonstar Co if there is significant uncertainty about the returns from the development.

The main issue with the asset-backed Sukuk finance is whether it would be as appealing as certainly the A-tranche of the securitisation arrangement which the non-executive director has proposed. The safer income that the securitisation offers A-tranche investors may be more appealing to investors than a marginally better return from the Sukuk. There will also be costs involved in establishing and gaining approval for the Sukuk, although these costs may be less than for the securitisation arrangement described above.

(ii) A Mudaraba contract would involve the bank providing capital for Moonstar Co to invest in the development. Moonstar Co would manage the investment which the capital funded. Profits from the investment would be shared with the bank, but losses would be solely borne by the bank. A Mudaraba contract is essentially an equity partnership, so Moonstar Co might not face the threat to its credit rating which it would if it obtained ordinary loan finance for the development. A Mudaraba contract would also represent a diversification of sources of finance. It would not require the commitment to pay interest that loan finance would involve.

Moonstar Co would maintain control over the running of the project. A Mudaraba contract would offer a method of obtaining equity funding without the dilution of control which an issue of shares to external shareholders would bring. This is likely to make it appealing to Moonstar Co’s directors, given their desire to maintain a dominant influence over the business.

The bank would be concerned about the uncertainties regarding the rental income from the development. Although the lack of involvement by the bank might appeal to Moonstar Co's directors, the bank might not find it so attractive. The bank might be concerned about information asymmetry – that Moonstar Co’s management might be reluctant to supply the bank with the information it needs to judge how well its investment is performing.