acca考试的考试年限有什么要求？

正确答案：
(b) The tax implications of the proposed restructuring of the Rapier Ltd group
(i) Immediate implications
Corporation tax
Rapier Ltd and its subsidiaries are in a capital gains group as Rapier Ltd owns at least 75% of the ordinary share capital
of each of the subsidiary companies. Any non-exempt items of plant and machinery owned by the subsidiaries will
therefore be transferred to Rapier Ltd at no gain, no loss.
No taxable credit or allowable debit will arise on the transfer of the subsidiaries’ goodwill to Rapier Ltd because the
companies are in a capital gains group.
The trading losses brought forward in Dirk Ltd will be transferred with the trade to Rapier Ltd as the effective ownership
of the three trades will not change (Rapier Ltd owns the subsidiaries which own the trades and, following the
restructuring, will own the three trades directly). The losses will be restricted to being offset against the future trading
profits of the Dirk trade only.
There will be no balancing adjustments in respect of the plant and machinery transferred to Rapier Ltd. Writing down
allowances will be claimed by the subsidiaries in respect of the year ending 30 June 2007 and by Rapier Ltd in respect
of future periods.
Value added tax (VAT)
No VAT should be charged on the sales of the businesses to Rapier Ltd as they are outside the scope of VAT. This is
because the trades are to be transferred as going concerns to a VAT registered person with no significant break in trading.
Switch Ltd must notify HM Revenue and Customs by 30 July 2007 that it has ceased to make taxable supplies.

正确答案：
(ii) ‘No frills’ low-cost budget airlines are usually associated with the following characteristics. Each of these characteristics
is considered in the context of Oceania National Airlines (ONA).
– Operational economies of scale
Increased flight frequency brings operational economies and is attractive to both business and leisure travellers. In
the international sector where ONA is currently experiencing competition from established ‘no frills’ low-cost budget
airlines ONA has, on average, one flight per day to each city. It would have to greatly extend its flight network, flight
frequency and the size of its aircraft fleet if it planned to become a ‘no frills’ carrier in this sector. This fleet
expansion appears counter to the culture of an organisation that has expanded very gradually since its formation.
Table 1 shows only three aircraft added to the fleet in the period 2004–2006. It is likely that the fleet size would
have to double for ONA to become a serious ‘no frills’ operator in the international sector. In the regional sector, the
flight density, an average of three flights per day, is more characteristic of a ‘no frills’ airline. However, ONA would
have to address the relatively low utilisation of its aircraft (see Tables 1 and 2) and the cost of maintenance
associated with a relatively old fleet of aircraft.
– Reduced costs through direct sales
On-line booking is primarily aimed at eliminating commission sales (usually made through travel agents). ‘No frills’
low-cost budget airlines typically achieve over 80% of their sales on-line. The comparative figure for ONA (see
Table 2) is 40% for regional sales and 60% for international sales, compared with an average of 84% for their
competitors. Clearly a major change in selling channels would have to take place for ONA to become a ‘no frills’
low-cost budget airline. It is difficult to know whether this is possible. The low percentage of regional on-line sales
seems to suggest that the citizens of Oceania may be more comfortable buying through third parties such as travel
agents.
– Reduced customer service
‘No frills’ low-cost budget airlines usually do not offer customer services such as free meals, free drinks and the
allocation of passengers to specific seats. ONA prides itself on its in-flight customer service and this was one of the
major factors that led to its accolade as Regional Airline of the Year. To move to a ‘no frills’ strategy, ONA would
have to abandon a long held tradition of excellent customer service. This would require a major cultural change
within the organisation. It would also probably lead to disbanding the award winning (Golden Bowl) catering
department and the redundancies of catering staff could prove difficult to implement in a heavily unionised
organisation.
Johnson, Scholes and Whittington have suggested that if an organisation is to ‘achieve competitive advantage through
a low price strategy then it has two basic choices. The first is to try and identify a market segment which is unattractive
(or inaccessible) to competitors and in this way avoid competitive pressures to erode price.’ It is not possible for ONA to
pursue this policy in the international sector because of significant competition from established continental ‘no frills’
low-cost budget airlines. It may be a candidate strategy for the regional sector, but the emergence of small ‘no frills’ lowcost
budget airlines in these countries threaten this. Many of these airlines enter the market with very low overheads
and use the ‘no frills’ approach as a strategy to gain market share before progressing to alternative strategies.
Secondly, a ‘no frills’ strategy depends for its success on margin. Johnson, Scholes and Whittington suggest that ‘in the
long run, a low price strategy cannot be pursued without a low-cost base’. Evidence from the scenario suggests that ONA
does not have a low cost base. It continues to maintain overheads (such as a catering department) that its competitors
have either disbanded or outsourced. More fundamentally (from Table 2), its flight crew enjoy above average wages and
the whole company is heavily unionised. The scenario acknowledges that the company pays above industry salaries and
offers excellent benefits such as a generous non-contributory pension. Aircraft utilisation and aircraft age also suggest a
relatively high cost base. The aircraft are older than their competitors and presumably incur greater maintenance costs.
ONA’s utilisation of its aircraft is also lower than its competitors. It seems highly unlikely that ONA can achieve the
changes required in culture, cost base and operations required for it to become a ‘no frills’ low-cost budget airline. Other
factors serve to reinforce this. For example:
– Many ‘no frills’ low-cost budget airlines fly into airports that offer cheaper taking off and landing fees. Many of these
airports are relatively remote from the cities they serve. This may be acceptable to leisure travellers, but not to
business travellers – ONA’s primary market in the regional sector.
– Most ‘no frills’ low-cost budget airlines have a standardised fleet leading to commonality and familiarity in
maintenance. Although ONA has a relatively small fleet it is split between three aircraft types. This is due to
historical reasons. The Boeing 737s and Airbus A320s appear to be very similar aircraft. However, the Boeings
were inherited from OceaniaAir and the Airbuses from Transport Oceania.
In conclusion, the CEO’s decision to reject a ‘no frills’ strategy for ONA appears to be justifiable. It would require major
changes in structure, cost and culture that would be difficult to justify given ONA’s current position. Revolution is the
term used by Baligan and Hope to describe a major rapid strategic change. It is associated with a sudden transformation
required to react to extreme pressures on the organisation. Such an approach is often required when the company is
facing a crisis and needs to quickly change direction. There is no evidence to support the need for a radical
transformation. This is why the CEO brands the change to a ‘no frills’ low-cost budget airline as ‘unnecessary’. The
financial situation (Table 3) is still relatively healthy and there is no evidence of corporate predators. It can be argued
that a more incremental approach to change would be beneficial, building on the strengths of the organisation and the
competencies of its employees. Moving ONA to a ‘no frills’ model would require seismic changes in cost and culture. If
ONA really wanted to move into this sector then they would be better advised to start afresh with a separate brand andairline and to concentrate on the regional sector where it has a head start over many of its competitors.

正确答案：
(b) Strategic and operational risks
Strategic risks
These arise from the overall strategic positioning of the company in its environment. Some strategic positions give rise to
greater risk exposures than others. Because strategic issues typically affect the whole of an organisation and not just one or
more of its parts, strategic risks can potentially concern very high stakes – they can have very high hazards and high returns.
Because of this, they are managed at board level in an organisation and form. a key part of strategic management.
Operational risks
Operational risks refer to potential losses arising from the normal business operations. Accordingly, they affect the day-to-day
running of operations and business systems in contrast to strategic risks that arise from the organisation’s strategic positioning.
Operational risks are managed at risk management level (not necessarily board level) and can be managed and mitigated by
internal control systems.
The secrecy option would be a strategic risk for the following reasons.
It would radically change the environment that SHC is in by reducing competition. This would radically change SHC’s strategic
fit with its competitive environment. In particular, it would change its ‘five forces’ positioning which would change its risk
profile.
It would involve the largest investment programme in the company’s history with new debt substantially changing the
company’s financial structure and making it more vulnerable to short term liquidity problems and monetary pressure (interest
rates).
It would change the way that stakeholders view SHC, for better or worse. It is a ‘crisis issue’, certain to polarise opinion either
way.
It will change the economics of the industry thereby radically affecting future cost, revenue and profit forecasts.
There may be retaliatory behaviour by SHC’s close competitor on 25% of the market.
[Tutorial note: similar reasons if relevant and well argued will attract marks]

正确答案：
(ii) Evidence supporting the assertion that development costs are technically feasible would include the following:
– Review the results of scientific tests performed on the products, for example, the results of animal or human testing
of the products.
– Discuss any detrimental results of these tests, e.g. harmful side effects, with the scientists working on the project
to determine what corrective action is being taken.
– Enquire whether any licences necessary for continued development and/or commercial production have been
granted by the appropriate regulatory body.
– Compare expected to actual development costs incurred per product being developed. Where actual costs are in
excess of expected costs investigate whether the extra costs have been incurred in order to make good any problems
identified in the development process.
– Review board minutes for relevant discussion of the product development taking place during the year.