注意查看！2020年海南省ACCA考试报名时间

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Tutorial note:
In order to apply any piece of legislation, judges have to determine its meaning. In other words they are required to interpret the
statute before them in order to give it meaning. The diffi culty, however, is that the words in statutes do not speak for themselves and
interpretation is an active process, and at least potentially a subjective one depending on the situation of the person who is doing
the interpreting.
Judges have considerable power in deciding the actual meaning of statutes, especially when they are able to deploy a number of
competing, not to say contradictory, mechanisms for deciding the meaning of the statute before them. There are, essentially, two
contrasting views as to how judges should go about determining the meaning of a statute – the restrictive, literal approach and the
more permissive, purposive approach.
(a) The literal approach
The literal approach is dominant in the English legal system, although it is not without critics, and devices do exist for
circumventing it when it is seen as too restrictive. This view of judicial interpretation holds that the judge should look primarily
to the words of the legislation in order to construe its meaning and, except in the very limited circumstances considered below,
should not look outside of, or behind, the legislation in an attempt to fi nd its meaning.
Within the context of the literal approach there are two distinct rules:
(i) The literal rule
Under this rule, the judge is required to consider what the legislation actually says rather than considering what it might
mean. In order to achieve this end, the judge should give words in legislation their literal meaning, that is, their plain,
ordinary, everyday meaning, even if the effect of this is to produce what might be considered an otherwise unjust or
undesirable outcome (Fisher v Bell (1961)) in which the court chose to follow the contract law literal interpretation of
the meaning of offer in the Act in question and declined to consider the usual non-legal literal interpretation of the word
(offer).

(ii) The golden rule
This rule is applied in circumstances where the application of the literal rule is likely to result in what appears to the court
to be an obviously absurd result. It should be emphasised, however, that the court is not at liberty to ignore, or replace,
legislative provisions simply on the basis that it considers them absurd; it must fi nd genuine diffi culties before it declines
to use the literal rule in favour of the golden one. As examples, there may be two apparently contradictory meanings to a
particular word used in the statute, or the provision may simply be ambiguous in its effect. In such situations, the golden
rule operates to ensure that preference is given to the meaning that does not result in the provision being an absurdity.
Thus in Adler v George (1964) the defendant was found guilty, under the Offi cial Secrets Act 1920, with obstruction
‘in the vicinity’ of a prohibited area, although she had actually carried out the obstruction ‘inside’ the area.
(b) The purposive approach
The purposive approach rejects the limitation of the judges’ search for meaning to a literal construction of the words of
legislation itself. It suggests that the interpretative role of the judge should include, where necessary, the power to look beyond
the words of statute in pursuit of the reason for its enactment, and that meaning should be construed in the light of that purpose
and so as to give it effect. This purposive approach is typical of civil law systems. In these jurisdictions, legislation tends to set
out general principles and leaves the fi ne details to be fi lled in later by the judges who are expected to make decisions in the
furtherance of those general principles.
European Community (EC) legislation tends to be drafted in the continental manner. Its detailed effect, therefore, can only be
determined on the basis of a purposive approach to its interpretation. This requirement, however, runs counter to the literal
approach that is the dominant approach in the English system. The need to interpret such legislation, however, has forced
a change in that approach in relation to Community legislation and even with respect to domestic legislation designed to
implement Community legislation. Thus, in Pickstone v Freemans plc (1988), the House of Lords held that it was permissible,
and indeed necessary, for the court to read words into inadequate domestic legislation in order to give effect to Community
law in relation to provisions relating to equal pay for work of equal value. (For a similar approach, see also the House of Lords’
decision in Litster v Forth Dry Dock (1989) and the decision in Three Rivers DC v Bank of England (No 2) (1996).) However,
it has to recognise that the purposive rule is not particularly modern and has its precursor in a long established rule of statutory
interpretation, namely the mischief rule.

The mischief rule
This rule permits the court to go behind the actual wording of a statute in order to consider the problem that the statute is
supposed to remedy.
In its traditional expression it is limited by being restricted to using previous common law rules in order to decide the operation
of contemporary legislation. Thus in Heydon’s case (1584) it was stated that in making use of the mischief rule the court
should consider what the mischief in the law was which the common law did not adequately deal with and which statute law
had intervened to remedy. Use of the mischief rule may be seen in Corkery v Carpenter (1950), in which a man was found
guilty of being drunk in charge of a carriage although he was in fact only in charge of a bicycle.

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(d) A provision under IAS37 ‘Provisions, Contingent Liabilities and Contingent assets’ can only be made in relation to the entity’s
restructuring plans where there is both a detailed formal plan in place and the plans have been announced to those affected.
The plan should identify areas of the business affected, the impact on employees and the likely cost of the restructuring and
the timescale for implementation. There should be a short timescale between communicating the plan and starting to
implement it. A provision should not be recognised until a plan is formalised.
A decision to restructure before the balance sheet date is not sufficient in itself for a provision to be recognised. A formal plan
should be announced prior to the balance sheet date. A constructive obligation should have arisen. It arises where there has
been a detailed formal plan and this has raised a valid expectation in the minds of those affected. The provision should only
include direct expenditure arising from the restructuring. Such amounts do not include costs associated with ongoing business
operations. Costs of retraining staff or relocating continuing staff or marketing or investment in new systems and distribution
networks, are excluded. It seems as though in this case a constructive obligation has arisen as there have been detailed formal
plans approved and communicated thus raising valid expectations. The provision can be allowed subject to the exclusion of
the costs outlined above.
Although executory contracts are outside IAS37, it is permissible to recognise a provision that is onerous. Onerous contracts
can result from restructuring plans or on a stand alone basis. A provision should be made for the best estimate of the excess
unavoidable costs under the onerous contract. This estimate should assess any likely level of future income from new sources.
Thus in this case, the rental income from sub-letting the building should be taken into account. The provision should be

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(b) Matters to be considered
Tutorial note: Candidates at this level must appreciate that the matters to be considered when planning the nature and
scope of the examination are not the same matters to be considered when deciding whether or not to accept an
engagement. The scenario clearly indicates that the assignment is being undertaken by the current auditor rendering any
‘pre-engagement’/‘professional etiquette’ considerations irrelevant to answering this question.
This PFI has been prepared to show an external user, the bank, the financial consequences of Cusiter’s plans to help the bank
in making an investment decision. If Cusiter is successful in its loan application the PFI provides a management tool against
which the results of investing in the plant and equipment can be measured.
The PFI is unpublished rather than published. That is, it is prepared at the specific request of a third party, the bank. It will
not be published to users of financial information in general.
The auditor’s report on the PFI will provide only negative assurance as to whether the assumptions provide a reasonable basis
for the PFI and an opinion whether the PFI is:
■ properly prepared on the basis of the assumptions; and
■ presented in accordance with the relevant financial reporting framework.
The nature of the engagement is an examination to obtain evidence concerning:
■ the reasonableness and consistency of assumptions made;
■ proper preparation (on the basis of stated assumptions); and
■ consistent presentation (with historical financial statements, using appropriate accounting principles).
Such an examination is likely to take the form. of inquiry, analytical procedures and corroboration.
The period of time covered by the prospective financial information is two years. The assumptions for 2008 are likely to be
more speculative than for 2007, particularly in relation to the impact on earnings, etc of the investment in new plant and
equipment.
The forecast for the year to 31 December 2007 includes an element of historical financial information (because only part of
this period is in the future) hence actual evidence should be available to verify the first three months of the forecast (possibly
more since another three-month period will expire at the end of the month).
Cusiter management’s previous experience in preparing PFI will be relevant. For example, in making accounting estimates
(e.g. for provisions, impairment losses, etc) or preparing cash flow forecasts (e.g. in support of the going concern assertion).
The basis of preparation of the forecast. For example, the extent to which it comprises:
■ proforma financial information (i.e. historical financial information adjusted for the effects of the planned loan and capital
expenditure transaction);
■ new information and assumptions about future performance (e.g. the operating capacity of the new equipment, sales
generated, etc).
The nature and scope of any standards/guidelines under which the PFI has been prepared is likely to assist the auditor in
discharging their responsibilities to report on it. Also, ISAE 3400 The Examination of Prospective Financial Information,
establishes standards and provides guidance on engagements to examine and report on PFI including examination
procedures.
The planned nature and scope of the examination is likely to take into account the time and fee budgets for the assignments
as adjusted for any ‘overlap’ with audit work. For example, the examination of the PFI is likely to draw on the auditor’s
knowledge of the business obtained in auditing the financial statements to 31 December 2006. Analytical procedures carried
out in respect of the PFI may provide evidence relevant to the 31 December 2007 audit.