请问浙江省考生ACCA国际会计师证书应该怎么注册呢?

正确答案：
2 Overview:
The accountant is frequently the manager or group leader. An understanding of leadership theory and practice is therefore an
important part of an accountant’s training.
Part (a):
Robert Blake and Jane Mouton in their Ohio State Leadership Studies, observed two basic leadership dimensions that were
apparent from their studies; concern for the task and concern for people.
They recognised that it was possible for concern for the task to be independent of concern for people. It was therefore possible for
a leader to be strong on one and weak on the other, strong on both, weak on both or any variation in between.
They devised a series of questions, the answers to which enabled them to plot these two basic leadership dimensions. These two
dimensions were placed as the axes on a grid structure now known as the Managerial Grid. A person who scores 7 on ‘concern
for production’ (the x axis) and 5 on ‘concern for people’ (the y axis) is known as a 7,5 leader.

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(d) Default surcharge
Although the VAT return was submitted on time (i.e. within one month of the end of the tax period), part of the quarterly VAT
liability has not yet been paid. As a result this payment will be made late and a surcharge liability notice will be issued on
the company. The surcharge period will run from the date of the notice until the anniversary of the end of the period for which
the VAT was paid late (i.e. until 31 March 2007). During this period any further default will extend the surcharge period and
any further late payments of VAT will attract a surcharge penalty of 2% on the first occasion, rising to 15% for successive late
payments.
Mis-declaration penalty
As the return understates the VAT payable, a potential mis-declaration penalty arises. The amount understated exceeds 30%
of the sum of the true input tax and output tax, known as the gross amount of tax (GAT) ((30% of (87,500 + 55,000) +
40,000) = 54,750). There has, thus, been a significant understatement of the true VAT return liability, resulting in a penalty
rate of 15% of the VAT which would have been lost had the error not been discovered. However, where an under declaration
arises out of a true error i.e. there is no intention to evade tax involved, and it is voluntarily disclosed, then a mis-declaration
penalty is not normally imposed. Although the company is still within the ‘period of grace’ allowed by HMRC for the correction
of errors in the next following VAT return, it would be advisable for Trent Limited to notify HMRC of the error immediately, in
writing, unless it has a ‘reasonable excuse’ for the error having occurred.
Default interest
Default interest is chargeable when an assessment to VAT arises for an amount that has been under declared in a previous
period, whether as a result of voluntary disclosure or as identified by HMRC. Interest is charged on a daily basis from the
date the under declaration should have been declared (i.e. 1 May 2006) to the date shown on the notice of assessment or
notice of voluntary disclosure. As given the size of the error the de minimis relief for voluntarily declared errors of less than
￡2,000 is not applicable, the only way for Trent Limited to minimise the interest charge is by means of early disclosure and
payment of the additional VAT due.

正确答案：

(a) An annual cash flow account compares the estimated cash flows receivable from the property against the liabilities within the securitisation process. The swap introduces leverage into the arrangement.

The holders of the certificates are expected to receive $3·17million on $18 million, giving them a return of 17·6%. If the cash flows are 5% lower than the non-executive director has predicted, annual revenue received will fall to $20·90 million, reducing the balance available for the subordinated certificates to $2·07 million, giving a return of 11·5% on the subordinated certificates, which is below the returns offered on the B and C-rated loan notes. The point at which the holders of the certificates will receive nothing and below which the holders of the C-rated loan notes will not receive their full income will be an annual income of $18·83 million (a return of 9·4%), which is 14·4% less than the income that the non-executive director has forecast.

(b) Benefits

The finance costs of the securitisation may be lower than the finance costs of ordinary loan capital. The cash flows from the commercial property development may be regarded as lower risk than Moonstar Co’s other revenue streams. This will impact upon the rates that Moonstar Co is able to offer borrowers.

The securitisation matches the assets of the future cash flows to the liabilities to loan note holders. The non-executive director is assuming a steady stream of lease income over the next 10 years, with the development probably being close to being fully occupied over that period.

The securitisation means that Moonstar Co is no longer concerned with the risk that the level of earnings from the properties will be insufficient to pay the finance costs. Risks have effectively been transferred to the loan note holders.

Risks

Not all of the tranches may appeal to investors. The risk-return relationship on the subordinated certificates does not look very appealing, with the return quite likely to be below what is received on the C-rated loan notes. Even the C-rated loan note holders may question the relationship between the risk and return if there is continued uncertainty in the property sector.

If Moonstar Co seeks funding from other sources for other developments, transferring out a lower risk income stream means that the residual risks associated with the rest of Moonstar Co’s portfolio will be higher. This may affect the availability and terms of other borrowing.

It appears that the size of the securitisation should be large enough for the costs to be bearable. However Moonstar Co may face unforeseen costs, possibly unexpected management or legal expenses.

(c) (i) Sukuk finance could be appropriate for the securitisation of the leasing portfolio. An asset-backed Sukuk would be the same kind of arrangement as the securitisation, where assets are transferred to a special purpose vehicle and the returns and repayments are directly financed by the income from the assets. The Sukuk holders would bear the risks and returns of the relationship.

The other type of Sukuk would be more like a sale and leaseback of the development. Here the Sukuk holders would be guaranteed a rental, so it would seem less appropriate for Moonstar Co if there is significant uncertainty about the returns from the development.

The main issue with the asset-backed Sukuk finance is whether it would be as appealing as certainly the A-tranche of the securitisation arrangement which the non-executive director has proposed. The safer income that the securitisation offers A-tranche investors may be more appealing to investors than a marginally better return from the Sukuk. There will also be costs involved in establishing and gaining approval for the Sukuk, although these costs may be less than for the securitisation arrangement described above.

(ii) A Mudaraba contract would involve the bank providing capital for Moonstar Co to invest in the development. Moonstar Co would manage the investment which the capital funded. Profits from the investment would be shared with the bank, but losses would be solely borne by the bank. A Mudaraba contract is essentially an equity partnership, so Moonstar Co might not face the threat to its credit rating which it would if it obtained ordinary loan finance for the development. A Mudaraba contract would also represent a diversification of sources of finance. It would not require the commitment to pay interest that loan finance would involve.

Moonstar Co would maintain control over the running of the project. A Mudaraba contract would offer a method of obtaining equity funding without the dilution of control which an issue of shares to external shareholders would bring. This is likely to make it appealing to Moonstar Co’s directors, given their desire to maintain a dominant influence over the business.

The bank would be concerned about the uncertainties regarding the rental income from the development. Although the lack of involvement by the bank might appeal to Moonstar Co's directors, the bank might not find it so attractive. The bank might be concerned about information asymmetry – that Moonstar Co’s management might be reluctant to supply the bank with the information it needs to judge how well its investment is performing.